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BOYLE V. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP.: THE
TURNING POINT FOR THE GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR DEFENSE?
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the development of strict products liability as a the-
ory of recovery has eased the plaintiff's burden in proving injury from
defective products.1 However, one group of manufacturers-military
contractors-has frequently escaped liability for the dangerous products
it manufactures. When faced with a products liability suit, the military
contractor raises the government contractor defense which "protects a
government contractor from liability for acts done by him while comply-
ing with government specifications during... performance of a contract
with the United States." 2 If successful, the contractor is shielded from
liability by sharing in the government's sovereign immunity.3
The government contractor defense protects military contractors
from liability for injuries caused by equipment that the contractor manu-
factures according to specifications provided by the government.4 It is an
affirmative defense which, when properly raised, provides a contractor
with a complete defense to claims sounding in warranty, negligence, or
strict tort liability.5 However, the government contractor defense is not
available when the injuries in question are caused by manufacturing
defects.6
1. Note, McKay v. Rockwell International Corp.: No Compulsion Required For Govern-
ment Contractor Defense, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1061, 1061 (1984).
2. Hubbs v. United Technologies, 574 F. Supp. 96, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (products liability
action against manufacturer of helicopter control system that allegedly malfunctioned causing
crash of Navy helicopter and death of three naval reservists).
3. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
4. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1043 (1984). See Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352, 354 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 821 (1985); Hendrix v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1551, 1555 (N.D.
Tex. 1986).
5. Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 597 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985); Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792
F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. filed (1986); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696
F.2d 246, 253 (3d Cir. 1982) (defense also applicable to claims based on breach of warranty);
In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Germany, 769 F.2d 115, 120 n.8 (3d Cir. 1985), cert
denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986), reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 1636 (1987) (defense applies to negligent
design cases as well as strict liability cases).
6. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451. See Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson
Co., 295 F.2d 14, 16 (9th Cir. 1961) (government contract defense does not protect contractors
from their own improper, careless or negligent acts); Brown, 696 F.2d at 253 (defense not
available if goods furnished to government were themselves defective); Johnston v. United
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Originally, the defense was used only in public works projects.7
However, recently it has been applied to cases involving alleged design
defects in military equipment.' Today, the government contractor de-
fense is used to shield government contractors from liability in a wide
variety of circumstances. The defense has been raised in cases involving
such diverse products as a Naval assault helicopter,9 an Army jeep,'° and
a pizza maker."
On May 27, 1986, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit issued three opinions concerning the government contrac-
tor defense. ' 2 The decisions were significant for two reasons. First, they
adopted the majority 3 form of the defense as the rule for the Fourth
Circuit. 4 Second, and more important, one of these cases, Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp., 5 has been granted certiorari by the United
States Supreme Court. 6 This grant of certiorari is of paramount impor-
tance because it raises issues of first impression before the Court and its
decision may establish the form of the government contractor defense to
be used in the future. 7
States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 356 (D. Kan. 1983) (contractor should be held liable for his own
negligence). See also Comment, The Government Contract Defense: An Overview, 27 How.
L.J. 275, 295 (1984) (discussion of government contract defense and defectively manufactured
products).
7. See infra notes 37-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the development of the
government contractor defense from public works cases.
8. See, eg., Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (1976), aff'd, 154
N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (N.J. App. 1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846
(1978).
9. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S.
Ct. 872 (1987) (alleged defective design of escape hatch in Marine CH-53 helicopter).
10. Sanner, 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (action against jeep manufacturer for failing to
install roll bar and seat belts).
11. Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1980) (alleged defec-
tive design of dough mixer in which infant plaintiff's hand was caught).
12. Tozer, 792 F.2d 403; Dowd v. Textron, Inc., 792 F.2d 409 (4th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed (1986); Boyle, 792 F.2d 413.
13. McKay, 704 F.2d 444. In McKay, the Ninth Circuit promulgated what has now be-
come the test used by a majority of the circuits in determining whether to grant immunity to a
military contractor. Under this test, a contractor must affirmatively prove four requirements:
1) that the United States was immune from liability; 2) that the government set or approved
reasonably precise specifications for the equipment; 3) that the equipment conformed to those
specifications; and 4) that the manufacturer warned the government of any dangers the manu-
facturer had actual knowledge of. Id. at 451.
14. Tozer, 792 F.2d at 408.
15. 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986).
16. 107 S. Ct. 872 (1987).
17. The importance of the Supreme Court's consideration of the defense was emphasized
recently when it was referred to as the "billion-dollar question." L.A. Times, Jan. 4, 1988,
part 1, at 1, col. 1.
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Currently, the Second,18 Third,19 Fourth,20 Fifth,2 ' Seventh 22 and
Ninth2 3 Circuits have all adopted essentially the same form of the gov-
ernment contractor defense. As used, this defense is based principally on
the Ninth Circuit's holding in McKay v. Rockwell International Corp.24
Only the Eleventh Circuit radically departs from the majority rule.25
The form of the defense which the Supreme Court adopts will, in all
probability, be some amalgamation of these two interpretations.
Thus, the issue before the Supreme Court in Boyle is not whether a
government contractor defense should exist, but rather what the dimen-
sions of the defense should be.26 The question is whether one of the two
major constructions of the defense, the McKay or Shaw formulations, or
some variation, should be adopted as the standard. A uniform standard
is necessary so that military contractors can predict the scope of liability
18. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
The district court in In re Agent Orange explicitly defined for the first time the elements of the
government contractor defense. The court held that to avoid liability a contractor must prove
three requirements: 1) that the government established the specifications for the product; 2)
that the product complied with those specifications in all material respects; and 3) that the
government knew as much as the contractor about the dangers of the product. Id. at 1055.
19. See Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 355 (recognizing In re Agent Orange three-part test and
extending it to include holding in McKay that continuous back-and-forth discussions between
government and contractor satisfy approval requirement).
20. See Tozer, 792 F.2d at 408 (adopting McKay four-part test).
21. See Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 1985) (adopting McKay four-
part test and specifically recognizing that governmental compulsion was not a requirement for
availability of the defense).
22. See Tillett, 756 F.2d at 597 (followed McKay and rejected governmental compulsion
requirement).
23. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
24. lit
25. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985), petition for cert
filed, 106 S. Ct. 2243 (1986). The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Shaw established the minority
form of the government contractor defense. Under this version of the defense, to avoid liabil-
ity a military contractor must prove that it did not participate, or only minimally participated,
in the design of the equipment; or, alternatively, that it warned the government of dangers in
the design and informed the government of any alternative designs reasonably known to the
contractor. Id at 746.
26. As the Fifth Circuit pointed out, the "'government contractor defense' ... has been
adopted to some extent by almost every court, both state and federal, that has considered the
matter." Bynum, 770 F.2d at 565. See, eg., In re Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1055; In re
Air Crash Disaster, 769 F.2d at 120; Tozer, 792 F.2d at 408; Tillett, 756 F.2d at 597; Johnston,
568 F. Supp. at 353; Sanner, 144 N.J. Super. at 8, 364 A.2d at 46; Casablanca, 104 Misc. 2d at
350, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 402; Hendrix, 634 F. Supp. at 1555. On the other hand, at least one
authority has argued that the government contractor defense is unnecessary and against public
policy. McCarthy & Mitzemnacher, If a Federal Government Military Contract Defense for
Military Aircraft Manufacturers Is the Solution-RWhat Is the Problem?, in THE GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR DEFENSE: A FAIR DEFENSE OR THE CONTRACTOR'S SHIELD? 51 (J. Madole
ed. 1986).
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to which they will be exposed. Also, the defense can be used as a way to
reduce litigation.27 If the government contractor defense was available in
products liability actions, and not necessarily limited to military equip-
ment, many suits would be resolved more quickly.2"
This Note will review the historical development of the government
contractor defense from agency theory and the contract specification de-
fense. Next, the Note will set forth the two main constructions of the
defense, those of the Ninth and the Eleventh Circuits. It will then dis-
cuss the Fourth Circuit's application of the government contractor de-
fense to the facts of Boyle. The reasoning and policy arguments behind
each of the elements of the defense will also be explored. Finally, the
Note will conclude with a proposed test for the availability of the govern-
ment contractor defense.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
A. Origins of the Defense
Traditionally, a contractor who strictly followed government design
specifications could avoid liability for damages resulting from imple-
menting those specifications by raising two defenses. The first traditional
defense uses principles of agency law to shield a contractor from tort
liability by sharing in the government's sovereign immunity.29 If the de-
fense is successfully raised, the same immunity that protects the govern-
ment from private lawsuits will be extended to shield the government
contractor from liability as well. Although this defense originated in
public works cases, a number of courts subsequently extended the princi-
ple to products liability litigation.30 This defense is only available when
27. Rivkin, The Government Contract Defense: A Proposal For The Expeditious Resolution
of Asbestos Litigation, 17 THE FORUM 1225, 1226 (1982) (use of government contractor de-
fense to speed asbestos litigation). The court in In reAgent Orange, 534 F. Supp. 1046, deter-
mined that product liability litigation should proceed in stages or phases. Id. at 1054 n.1.
Certain legal issues such as the availability of the government contractor defense would be
resolved in separate trials. The In re Agent Orange court proposed that the government con-
tractor defense be raised in the first trial or phase. Id Thus, if the defense is successfully
raised, the action can be dismissed at an early stage, saving court time and costs. "The suc-
cessful assertion of the defense will obviate the need for the extensive discovery procedures and
complex, lengthy and duplicative trials which threaten to congest the court dockets for years
to come." Rivkin, supra, at 1238.
28. Rivkin, supra note 27, at 1226.
29. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 564 (5th Cir. 1985).
30. See Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
aff'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967) (civilian employee of Navy injured by blasting caps manu-
factured by defendant; in dicta court stated that manufacturer could escape liability if product
was produced according to government specifications); Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J.
Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (N.J. App. 1977), cert.
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the government is the party writing the product's specifications.
The second traditional defense is the contract specification de-
fense.31 This defense protects manufacturers who reasonably follow the
specifications of a third party in producing a product that later proves to
be dangerous.32 Unlike the agency defense, the availability of the con-
tract specification defense is not dependent on the identity of the party
making the specifications. The party making the product's specifications
may be the government or any other third party.33 The contract specifi-
cation defense is grounded in principles of negligence and has not been
extended to other theories of recovery.34
In general, most authorities cite one or both of these principles as
the origin of the present form of the government contractor defense.35
However, neither of the traditional defenses alone survives today as a
viable defense for the modem government contractor.36 In order to pro-
vide a basis for an understanding of the present government contractor
defense, the following sections briefly discuss the agency and contract
specification defenses.
1. Agency theory
The government contractor defense had its genesis in actions against
government contractors involved in public works projects.37 This early
version of the defense is based on elementary principles of agency.38 The
agency defense is best illustrated by the case of Yearsley v. W.A. Ross
denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978) (manufacturer not liable for injuries caused by jeep it
manufactured in conformance with government specifications which did not include seat belts
or roll bar).
31. Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 353 (D. Kan. 1983).
32. Id. at 354.
33. Id
34. Id.
35. The government contractor defense "is essentially a judicial amalgamation of the two
traditional defenses [contract specification and agency]." Bynum, 770 F.2d at 565; see Tozer v.
LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405 (4th Cir.),petitionfor cerL filed (1986) (original form of defense
set forth in Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940)); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co.,
756 F.2d 591, 596 (7th Cir. 1985) (defense was derived from Yearsley); McKay v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984) (government
contractor defense first articulated by Supreme Court in Yearsley); Johnston v. United States,
568 F. Supp. 351, 353 (D. Kan. 1983) (government contractor defense is "in reality an amal-
gam of two separate defenses [contract specification and agency] . . ").
36. "Neither defense, however, has retained its vitality in the context of a modem products
liability action against a manufacturer of military equipment." Bynum, 770 F.2d at 563.
37. See, e.g., Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940) (damage resulting
from erosion caused by contractor); Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824
(D. Conn. 1965) (damage caused by river dredging).
38. Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 21. "A person is subject to liability for the consequences of
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Construction Co.
39
In Yearsley, a contractor under the direction and authority of the
government was hired to make the Missouri River more navigable.
40
The contractor built dikes and used large boats with paddles and pumps
to create artificial erosion.41 During the erosion process, ninety-five acres
of the plaintiff's land were flooded.42 The plaintiff sued the contractor
for damages. The Supreme Court held that "there is no ground for hold-
ing [the government's] agent liable [when he] is simply acting under...
authority... validly conferred. '4 3 The Court asserted that "[t]he action
of the agent is 'the act of the government.' 44 Although not expressly
stated, the Supreme Court implied that the contractor was permitted to
share in the government's cloak of sovereign immunity.45 Thus, under
the holding of Yearsley, a public works contractor who is following direc-
tions given by the government can avoid tort liability for damages caused
by the activity.46 Of course, if the contractor fails to follow the govern-
ment's particular specifications or commits an error in the manufacturing
process he forfeits the defense.47
The Yearsley defense is difficult to apply in the military contractor
context because the defendant must prove that an agency relationship
existed between the government and the contractor. "The difficulty of
establishing a traditional agency relationship with the government makes
the derivative sovereign immunity defense ill-suited to many manufactur-
ers of military equipment. ' '41 Further, changes in the military procure-
another's conduct which results from his directions as he would be for his own personal con-
duct .. " RFsATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 212 (1957).
39. 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
40. Id. at 19.
41. Id.
42. Id at 20.
43. Id at 22.
44. Id. (quoting United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 465-66 (1903)).
45. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 564. "Based on the medieval notion that the king can do no
wrong, sovereign immunity precludes a litigant from asserting an otherwise meritorious cause
of action against a sovereign or a party with sovereign attributes unless the sovereign consents
to the suit." Principe Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Board of Comm'rs, 333 F. Supp. 353, 355
(E.D. La. 1971) (emphasis added). Under this theory, a party who is subject to a court's
jurisdiction may still escape tort liability by invoking the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id.
See also Dawson v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 712 F.2d 264,267 (7th Cir. 1983) ("As a general
rule, the United States Government, as 'sovereign,' is liable to third parties only when the
government expressly waives its sovereign immunity.").
46. Prior to the Federal Tort Claims Act, the only recourse an injured party would have in
a case such as Yearsley would be against the federal government for the "taking" of property
without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
47. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 564.
48. Id For the Yearsley agency defense to be available, the government must have a prin-
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ment process since the time of Yearsley and theories of products liability
recovery have also rendered this defense unsuitable for military
contractors. 49
2. Contract specification defense
Unlike the Yearsley agency defense, the contract specification de-
fense applies to both private and government contractors.5 0 The defense
is available whenever products are manufactured according to the specifi-
cations supplied by a third party."' Provided that the contractor adheres
cipal/agent relationship with the military contractor. Comment, Government Contract De-
fense: Sharing the Protective Cloak of Sovereign Immunity After McKay v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 37 BAYLOR L. REv. 181, 222 nn.316, 318 (1985) [hereinafter Sharing the Protective
Cloak].
An agency relationship arises when one party, the principal, authorizes another party, the
agent, to be the principal's representative and to act in furtherance of the principal's interests
and under his direction. R. KIMBROUGH, SUMMARY OF AMERICAN LAW § 1:1 (1974). The
difficulty with proving agency in today's military procurement process is that many govern-
ment contractors have merely a buyer/seller or independent contractor relationship with the
government. Sharing the Protective Cloak, supra. Thus, the defense is unavailable to contrac-
tors who are unable to show the amount of governmental control necessary to establish
agency. Id. See Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010, 1015 (5th Cir. 1969) (in
action for injuries caused by grenade, court refused to find agency relationship and refused to
extend sovereign immunity to contractor that produced grenades according to strict govern-
ment specifications); Comment, In Defense of The Government Contractor Defense, 36 CATH.
U.L. REV. 219, 228 (1986) (independent military contractors do not have agency relationship,
military contractors cannot successfully raise Yearsley agency defense).
49. Amici Curiae Brief at 18, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. (U.S. Oct., 1986) (No.
86-492) [hereinafter Amici Brief] (changes over last 30 years have rendered Yearsley defense
inadequate to respond to present day problems). Recently, at least one commentator has
urged a return to the agency concepts of Yearsley. See Sharing the Protective Cloak, supra note
48, at 219. The author proposed that the concept of sharing governmental immunity on the
basis of agency be extended and refined to be more applicable in the military contractor con-
text. Id. at 219-20. He argued that basing the defense on the principles of agency would
eliminate the confusion surrounding the current form of the defense and provide a degree of
uniformity among the various jurisdictions. Id. at 221.
50. Johnston, 568 F. Supp. at 354. "The contract specification defense applies to products
manufactured to the order and specification of another, whether that other be the government
or a private party." Id. See also Littlehale, 268 F. Supp. at 802 n.16 (defense is "equally
applicable where a private party contracts for a product to be manufactured or building to be
done").
51. Johnston, 568 F. Supp. at 354. A contractor cannot be held liable if he is merely
following the plans, specifications, and directions given to him, since under those circum-
stances the responsibility is assumed by his employer. Davis v. Henderlong Lumber Co., 221
F. Supp. 129, 134 (N.D. Ind. 1963) (following specifications of its employer, contractor held
not liable for building chemical fume hood that caused injury); see also Burgess v. Colorado
Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846 (11th Cir. 1985) (defendant manufactured animal vaccine ac-
cording to strict government specifications; when vaccine caused injury, defendant was allowed
to raise government contractor defense). This is the rule provided that the specifications con-
tain no obviously dangerous defects that would cause a reasonable man not to follow them.
Davis, 221 F. Supp. at 134.
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to the specifications of its employer,
[t]he contractor is not subject to liability if the specified design
or material turns out to be insufficient to make the chattel safe
for use, unless it is so obviously bad that a competent contrac-
tor would realize that there was a grave chance that his product
would be dangerously unsafe.
52
However, any special knowledge that the contractor possesses can, in
certain circumstances, subject the contractor to a higher standard of
care.
53
The rationale supporting this defense is that the average contractor
cannot be expected to possess knowledge and expertise sufficient to allow
it to review every design it is given.54 Thus, a contractor, where it is
reasonable, is allowed to rely on the superior knowledge and expertise of
the party making the specifications. 5 The contract specification defense
is based on the negligence concept of reasonable reliance. 6 Where it is
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 404 comment a (1965).
53. "[I]n those unexpected cases where the manufacturer has special knowledge or exper-
tise, he may be held to as high a standard of care as the designer-or higher." Johnston, 568 F.
Supp. at 354. Or, more directly, "[t]he standard of responsibility for the ordinary contractor is
that usually possessed by persons in his place." Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 187 F.2d
832, 835 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 936 (1951) (electrical contractor held to level of skill
of others in his field).
As pointed out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an important factor in determining
the standard of reasonable conduct for a party is the possession of superior knowledge or skill.
"The actor is required to recognize that his conduct involves a risk of causing an invasion of
another's interest if a reasonable man would do so while exercising... such superior...
knowledge, intelligence, and judgment as the actor himself has." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 289 (1965); see also id. § 289 comment m (actor having superior knowledge must use
that knowledge in a manner reasonable under the circumstances); id. § 389 comment e, illus-
tration 1 (contractor who builds house from plans specifying obviously cheap and inferior
materials is liable for injuries).
54. Johnston, 568 F. Supp. at 354. "[The contractor is not required to sit in judgment on
the plans and specifications or the materials provided by his employer." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
O ND) OF TORTS § 404 comment a (1965). "[J]ust as a nurse or orderly will seldom be in a
position to second guess a physician," a manufacturer should not be held to the same high
standard of care as the designer of the product. Johnston, 568 F. Supp. at 354.
55. Ryan v. Feeney & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 239 N.Y. 43, 45-46, 145 N.E. 321, 321-22
(1924). In that case, the government supplied specifications for a canopy that proved to be
unsafe. Id The court stated that "[a] builder or contractor is justified in relying upon the
plans and specifications which he has contracted to follow, unless they are so apparently defec-
tive that an ordinary builder of ordinary prudence would be put upon notice that the work was
dangerous and likely to cause injury." Id. See also Littlehale, 268 F. Supp. at 802 n. 16; Aus-
ness, Surrogate Immunity: The Government Contract Defense and Products Liability, 47 OHIO
ST. L.J. 985, 993 n.64 (1986).
56. A contractor should be able to reasonably rely on the superior skill or knowledge of
the party making the specifications. See Johnston, 568 F. Supp. at 354; Ausness, supra note 55,
at 993 n.64.
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reasonable, a contractor will be allowed to rely on a third party's specifi-
cations for a product.
Although the reasonableness of the contractor's actions may be rele-
vant in negligence cases, they would be irrelevant in a strict products
liability action." Since the majority of litigation involving military
equipment is based on strict products liability, the availability of the con-
tract specification defense for use by military contractors is very
limited.58
In sum, the Yearsley agency defense and the contract specification
defense are limited in their applicability to modem products liability ac-
tions involving military contractors. Consequently, to protect govern-
ment contractors from unfair liability, the courts developed the modem
version of the government contractor defense.
B. The Feres-Stencel Doctrine
One of the primary rationales underlying the present day govern-
ment contractor defense is the Feres-Stencel doctrine. 9 At the heart of
this doctrine is the concept of sovereign immunity. Simply stated, sover-
eign immunity protects the federal government from suit unless the gov-
ernment has given its prior consent.' With the enactment of the Federal
Tort Claims Act61 (FTCA), the government waived much of its immu-
nity. The FTCA limited the government's sovereign immunity by sub-
jecting the government to tort liability in the "same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances."'62 The
FTCA, however, contains an exception for military personnel.63 During
57. "Successful application of the contract specification defense depends... on the con-
cepts of fault and negligence." In Defense of The Government Contractor Defense, supra note
48, at 228. Thus, the contract specification defense is not available in suits brought in strict
liability against government contractors. Id.; see Johnston, 568 F. Supp. at 354; see also Note,
supra note 1, at 1070.
58. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 739 (1lth Cir. 1985), petition for
cert. filed, 106 S. Ct. 2243 (1986). See In Defense of The Government Contractor Defense, supra
note 48, at 228.
59. "The reasons for applying the government contractor defense to suppliers of military
equipment with design defects approved by the government parallel those supporting the
Feres-Stencel doctrine[.]" Hubbs v. United Technologies, 574 F. Supp. 96, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
see also McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1043 (1984).
60. Principe Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Board of Comm'rs, 333 F. Supp. 353, 355 (E.D.
La. 1971).
61. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1983).
62. Id. § 2671.
63. Id. § 2680(j). The provisions of the FTCA do not apply to "[alny claim arising out of
the combatant activities of the military or naval forces ... during time of war." Id.
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time of war, a member of the armed forces cannot recover damages from
the government under the FrCA.64 In interpreting this exception, the
courts developed the Feres-Stencel doctrine.65 This doctrine provides the
primary justification for the government contractor defense.
66
The Feres-Stencel doctrine developed from the holdings of two
United States Supreme Court cases. In Feres v. United States,67 the
Supreme Court stated that the "[g]overnment is not liable under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise
out of or are in the course of activity incident to service."' 68 The Court
based its judgment on the rationales underlying the FTCA.69
The Court cited three main rationales for its holding: (1) the "dis-
tinctively federal... character" of the relationship between the govern-
ment and the members of its armed forces;70 (2) the availability of an
alternate compensation system,71 "which normally requires no litigation,
64. Id.
65. The Feres-Stencel doctrine developed from the holdings of two Supreme Court cases:
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) and Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431
U.S. 666 (1976).
66. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Note, Schoenborn v.
Boeing Co.: The Government Contractor Defense Becomes a "Windfall"for Military Contrac-
tors, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 287, 291 (1985).
67. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The Feres case was actually a consolidation of three cases. Id. at
136. The Feres case involved a negligence action brought against the United States. Id. at 136-
37. Decedent, a member of the military on active duty, perished during a fire in his barracks.
Id. The executrix of Feres alleged negligence for quartering decedent in a barracks having a
defective heating plant. Id. at 137. Second, in the Jefferson case, the plaintiff, while in the
Army, sued the Army for negligence in leaving a towel 30 inches long by 18 inches wide,
marked "Medical Department U. S. Army," in his stomach during abdominal surgery. Id.
Last, the plaintiff in the Griggs case alleged that decedent, while on active duty, died from
negligent and unskilled medical treatment from Army surgeons. Id.
68. Id. at 146. After more than 30 years, the holding of Feres is still embraced by the
Supreme Court. United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987) (military pilot killed in
helicopter crash resulting from alleged negligence of civilian air traffic controller). "[The
Feres doctrine has been applied consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members
against the Government based upon service-related injuries. We decline to modify the doctrine
at this late date." Id. at 2067.
69. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.
70. d at 143. The Court explained that "the scope, nature, legal incidents and conse-
quences of the relation between persons in service and the Government are fundamentally
derived from federal sources and governed by federal authority." Id. at 143-44 (citation omit-
ted). As a result, the Court concluded that "[ilt would hardly be a rational plan of providing
for those disabled in service.., to leave them dependent upon geographic considerations over
which they have no control and to laws which fluctuate in existence and value." Id. at 143.
71. The alternate compensation system the Court was referring to was the Veterans' Bene-
fits Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1983). The Veterans' Benefits Act (VBA) is a no-fault mili-
tary compensation system which provides a "simple, certain, and uniform compensation for
injuries or death of those in armed services." Feres, 340 U.S. at 144. Under the VBA, the
surviving spouse or dependents of a veteran who died from injuries received while on active
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[and] is not negligible or niggardly. .";11 and (3) "[t]he peculiar and
special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the main-
tenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might
obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent or-
ders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty
... ."3 The Court concluded that the government is not liable under the
FTCA for injuries to servicemen when the injuries arise out of or are in
the course of their military duties.74
After Feres, members of the armed forces were barred from recover-
ing in tort from the government." As a result, servicemen began to
bring tort actions against the military contractors who had manufactured
the government-designed equipment that caused their injuries.7 6 These
manufacturers were often found liable even though they frequently had
very little, if any, discretion in the design specifications that caused the
injury.77 "Thus, contractors found themselves paying for the govern-
ment's design defects, particularly in strict liability jurisdictions where
the presence of the military contractor's negligence was irrelevant."7 If
the holding in Feres was a heavy burden on government contractors, the
decision in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States79 broke the
duty will be compensated at certain monthly rates specified in the VBA. 38 U.S.C. § 321
(1983).
72. Feres, 340 U.S. at 145. The Court noted that the recoveries available through the VBA
compared "extremely favorably" with those available through most worker's compensation
statutes. Id. "Thus one classic rationale for tort liability-that of compensation of victims-is
less compelling in this context." Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403,407 (4th Cir.), petition for
cert. filed (1986). In cases where the VBA does not provide full compensation, it must still be
recognized that the compensation available from the VBA is "not reduced by the high transac-
tion costs present in ordinary products liability litigation." McKay, 704 F.2d at 452 n.ll.
73. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954) (explaining Feres); see also Bynum,
770 F.2d at 561. The Supreme Court recently affirmed this rationale and stated that "[e]ven if
military negligence is not specifically alleged in a tort action, a suit based upon service-related
activity necessarily implicates the military judgments and decisions that are inextricably inter-
twined with the conduct of the military mission." United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063,
2069 (1987). Further, "[s]uits brought by service members against the Government for ser-
vice-related injuries could undermine the commitment essential to effective service and thus
have the potential to disrupt military discipline in the broadest sense of the word." Id
74. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
75. Id
76. In Defense of The Government Contractor Defense, supra note 48, at 226.
77. See, eg., Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985) (government specifica-
tions did not include roll over protection on front end loader); Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144
N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (N.J. App. 1977),
cert. denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978) (government required jeeps manufactured with-
out seatbelts).
78. In Defense of The Government Contractor Defense, supra note 48, at 226.
79. 431 U.S. 666 (1977). In Stencel, the plaintiff, a National Guard officer, was perma-
nently injured when the ejection system in his F-100 fighter plane malfunctioned. Id. at 667.
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proverbial camel's back.
Stencel marked the second step in the development of the Feres-
Stencel doctrine. The case also illustrates the hardships that government
contractors faced before the government contractor defense was formu-
lated. The decision in Stencel broadened the scope of the government's
immunity in actions involving members of the military. The holding
barred contractors from seeking indemnity from the government for
damages the contractor was required to pay to injured military service-
men. ° This was true even when the injuries resulted from equipment the
contractor manufactured in accordance with government specifica-
tions."'
The Court asserted that the rationales underlying Feres were equally
applicable in actions where a third party was seeking indemnity from the
government.82 Litigation involving an indemnity claim would take virtu-
ally the identical form as a direct action brought against the government
by an injured serviceman.83
Regardless of whether the action was direct or by a contractor seek-
ing indemnity, "[t]he trial would ... involve second-guessing military
orders, and would often require members of the Armed Services to testify
in court as to each other's decisions and actions."84 Thus, for essentially
the same reasons used to bar direct actions against the government in
Feres, third-party indemnity actions were also barred under Stencel.85
Since Stencel was decided, the third rationale used by the Feres
Court has become the principal justification for the Feres-Stencel doc-
trine.8 6 Specifically, in justifying the Feres-Stencel doctrine the Supreme
Plaintiff brought a negligence action against Stencel the manufacturer and against the United
States. Md at 668. Stencel cross-claimed against the United States for indemnity, alleging that
the government had set the ejection system's specifications. Id The government moved for
summary judgment arguing that the plaintiff could not recover under the FTCA for injuries
sustained incident to military service. Id The government cited Feres as barring not only
direct actions against the government, but also indemnity actions Id at 669.
80. Id. at 673.
81. Id at 673-74:
82. Id at 674. The Court refused to "judicially admit at the back door that which has
been legislatively turned away at the front door [through the FTCA]." Id. at 673.
83. Id at 673.
84. Id
85. Id
86. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 562. The third rationale involved the peculiar relationship of the
soldier to his superiors and the adverse effects of allowing judicial scrutiny of military deci-
sions. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Thus, the central question in applying the
Feres-Stencel doctrine has become whether the action will require the courts to second-guess
military decisions and whether maintaining the suit would impair military discipline. Bynum,
770 F.2d at 562. See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
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Court recently noted that the other factors discussed in Feres were no
longer controlling.17 In United States v. Shearer,8" the Court held that
the primary factors justifying the Feres-Stencel doctrine today are
"whether the suit requires the civilian court to second-guess military de-
cisions... and whether the suit might impair essential military discipline
"89
The Feres-Stencel doctrine provided the government with immunity
from either a direct suit by a member of the military for service-related
injuries, or an action for indemnity by a contractor to recover damages
paid, resulting from those same injuries. To allow either type of action to
proceed would require a civilian court to second-guess military decisions
or to otherwise impair essential military discipline and effectiveness,
which would be in direct conflict with the principles underlying the
Feres-Stencel doctrine. 90
The Feres-Stencel doctrine presented an insurmountable obstacle for
government contractors. A contractor who was required by law to ad-
here to specifications generated by the government would be held liable
for injuries with no opportunity to seek indemnity from the government.
As a result, military equipment manufacturers were restricted to the lim-
ited protections provided by the traditional agency and contract specifi-
cation defenses. 91
A new defense was needed because the traditional defenses of
87. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 58 n.4. However, the Supreme Court recently returned to empha-
sizing all three of the Feres rationales in its decision to uphold government immunity in United
States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 2068.
88. 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
89. Id. at 57 (citation omitted). The Court went on to assert that:
[t]o permit this type of suit would mean that commanding officers would have to
stand prepared to convince a civilian court of the wisdom of a wide range of military
and disciplinary decisions; for example, whether to overlook a particular incident or
episode, whether to discharge a serviceman, and whether and how to place restraints
on a soldier's off-base conduct.
Id. at 58.
Further, the Supreme Court has consistently questioned its competency in areas dealing
with military authority.
It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental action
that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political branches directly
responsible-as the Judicial Branch is not-to the electoral process. Moreover, it is
difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less
competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition,
training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional mili-
tary judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive
Branches.
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (emphasis in original).
90. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57.
91. See supra notes 38-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the traditional agency
and contract specification defenses.
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agency and contract specification were no longer adequate for the
problems that arise today involving government contractors. 92 That de-
fense is the judicially created government contractor defense.
C. The Majority Rule: McKay v. Rockwell
1. Majority opinion
In McKay v. Rockwell,93 the Ninth Circuit established the test used
by a majority of the federal circuits for determining the extent of a mili-
tary contractor's liability. The majority in McKay held that "only under
... limited circumstances ... should a manufacturer be held strictly
liable in tort for injuries to a serviceman on active duty caused by design
defects in military equipment." 94 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
same rationale used to justify the Feres-Stencel doctrine applied equally
well to justify the government contractor defense.95
The court cited four policies to justify the government contractor
defense.96 First, holding a military contractor liable without considering
the extent of the government's involvement in the production of the
equipment's design specifications would subvert the Feres-Stencel doc-
trine.97 Government contractors would pass the costs of accidents on to
the government through "cost overrun provisions in equipment con-
tracts, through reflecting the price of liability insurance in the contracts,
92. See Bynum, 770 F.2d at 563 (neither defense has retained its vitality); Amici Brief,
supra note 49, at 18 (changes in tort law have rendered traditional defenses inadequate); In
Defense of The Government Contractor Defense, supra note 48, at 227 (traditional defenses
either ineffective or difficult to establish).
93. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). McKay involved an
action brought by the widows of two Navy pilots who were killed in unrelated crashes of RA-
5C jet aircraft. Md at 446. The RA-5C jets are designed to be used as carrier-based supersonic
reconnaissance aircraft. Ma Both pilots were killed because of defects in the aircraft's ejection
system. Id. Rockwell was the manufacturer of both the RA-5C and its ejection system. Id.
The plaintiffs sued Rockwell, seeking damages for the death of plaintiffs' decedents under theo-
ries of negligence, breach of warranty, and wrongful death. Id. at 447.
94. Id. at 447. The court was referring to the definition of strict liability as set forth in the
Restatement Second of Torts:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability ....
(2) The rule ... applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
95. McKay, 704 F.2d at 449.
96. Id at 449-50; see also Hubbs v. United Technologies, 574 F. Supp. 96, 98 (E.D. Pa.
1983).
97. McKay, 704 F.2d at 449.
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or through higher prices in later equipment sales.""8 This pass-through
of costs defeated the purpose of the government's immunity for injuries
to members of the military. 99
Second, holding military contractors liable for design defects when
the government specified or approved the design specifications would
"thrust the judiciary into the making of military decisions."'"0 The
Ninth Circuit pointed out that courts are at the limits of their compe-
tence when deciding military matters and that necessarily, separation of
powers becomes a valid concern.10
Third, in specifying the design of military equipment, the govern-
ment is required by the "exigencies of our defense effort to push technol-
ogy towards its limits and thereby to incur risks beyond those that would
be acceptable for ordinary consumer goods."' 0 2 This continuing expan-
sion of technology resulted in the manufacturer regularly being unable to
negotiate with the government to minimize such risks.'03 Military con-
tractors were thereby burdened with liability for risks the United States
government chose to take. Thus, if the military designed a new piece of
equipment that was inherently dangerous, the manufacturer would be
exposed to liability, but the government would not.
The final policy supporting the government contractor defense is
that the defense provides "incentives for suppliers of military equipment
to work closely with and to consult the military authorities in the devel-
opment and testing of equipment."" By conditioning the availability of
the defense on full disclosure of all known risks, contractors will have an
incentive to work closely with the government in the design and testing
of equipment. 05
Therefore, the majority held that under the Feres-Stencel doctrine
and the government contract defense, a military equipment manufacturer
is not subject to liability for design defects under section 402A of the
Restatement of Torts 0 6 where:
98. Id
99. Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. filed (1986); see also
Tilett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 597 (7th Cir. 1985); Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United
States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 827 (D. Conn. 1965).
100. McKay, 704 F.2d at 449.
101. Id.; see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
102. McKay, 704 F.2d at 449-50; see also Tozer, 792 F.2d at 406 ("[w]hat would pose an
unreasonable risk to the safety of civilians might be acceptable-or indeed necessary-in light
of the military mission").
103. McKay, 704 F.2d at 450.
104. Id.
105. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 1985).
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Recently, the four-prong test set
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(1) the United States is immune from liability under Feres and
Stencel,10 7 (2) the supplier proves that the United States estab-
lished, or approved,108 reasonably precise specifications for the
allegedly defective military equipment,10 9 (3) the equipment
conformed to those specifications,' 10 and (4) the supplier
warned the United States about patent errors in the govern-
ment's specifications or about dangers involved in the use of the
equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the
United States."'
This is the formulation of the defense followed by six of the appellate
circuits.1
12
The dissenting opinion in McKay discussed many of the objections
opponents of the defense have raised.' Judge Alarcon's dissent in Mc-
Kay and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Shaw are two of the major
sources of opposition to the expansion of the defense.
2. Judge Alarcon's dissenting opinion
In his dissent, Judge Alarcon concluded that the Feres-Stencel doc-
forth in McKay has been applied in other actions besides strict products liability. "[Tihe [Mc-
Kay] court's reasoning applies equally well to design defect cases based on negligence and/or
breach of warranty claims." Tillett, 756 F.2d at 597 n.3; see also Tozer, 792 F.2d at 408; In re
Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Germany, 769 F.2d 115, 120 n.8 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1082 (1986), reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 1636 (1987) (defense applies to negligence ac-
tions as well as strict liability); Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d
400, 402 (1980) (doctrine is as applicable to strict liability actions as it is to negligence actions).
107. This prong will be referred to as the "governmental immunity prong."
108. In McKay, the Ninth Circuit expanded the previous formulation of the defense set
forth in In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1982): In
In re Agent Orange, the requirement was that the "government established the specifications."
Id The McKay court expanded the defense to include not only those situations where the
government established the specifications, but also those situations where the government
merely approved the specifications. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
109. This second requirement is referred to as the "approval prong."
110. This is known as the "conformance prong."
111. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451. This fourth requirement is the "duty to warn prong." This
Note will refer to these requirements as the McKay four-prong test. Regardless, the govern-
ment contractor defense does not relieve military equipment suppliers from liability for defects
caused during the manufacture of the equipment. Id.
112. See In re Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1055 (E.D.N.Y.); Koutsoubos v. Boeing
Vertol, 755 F.2d 352, 355 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985); Tozer, 792 F.2d at 408
(4th Cir.); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett, 756 F.2d at 597
(7th Cir.); McKay, 704 F.2d at 451 (9th Cir.).
113. See, eg., Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (1 1th Cir. 1985), petition
for cert. filed, 106 S. Ct. 2243 (1986); McCarthy & Mitzenmacher, supra note 26, at 5 1; Note,
supra note 66.
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trine applied only to the liability of the United States. 11 4 He was not
persuaded by the majority's attempt to extend the doctrine to shield gov-
ernment contractors from liability." 5 He argued that the Feres-Stencel
doctrine only applied to legal actions directed specifically at the govern-
ment and had no application to contractor liability. 16 Because the plain-
tiffs in McKay did not file either a direct claim or a claim for
indemnification against the United States, Judge Alarcon opined that the
claims "reside[d] outside the previously defined area of concern ex-
pressed in Feres-Stencel ... ,,1"7
Judge Alarcon also rejected the majority's cost pass-through argu-
ment. He pointed out that barring indemnification is fair because the
contractor "no doubt had sufficient notice so as to take this risk [i.e.,
being held liable without indemnification by the government] into ac-
count in negotiating its contract ... ."18 The dissent argued that pass-
through of costs would be minimized by the dynamics of the free market
system. 119
Finally, the dissent rejected the majority's four-prong test.1 20 Judge
Alarcon argued that the test would allow military contractors to easily
shift responsibility to the government for the safety of the equipment the
contractor designed. 121 In his opinion, the contractor should be immune
from liability only when an element of compulsion is present.'2 2 Thus,
only when the government compels a contractor to act should the de-
114. McKay, 704 F.2d at 456 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
117. Ik (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 457 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (quoting Stencel Aero Eng'g Co. v. United States,
431 U.S. 666, 674 n.8 (1977)).
119. Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 458 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting). "In those situations where compulsion exists ... the
contractor should be immune from suit." Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting). During the early years
of the defense, some courts held that compulsion had to be present for the defense to be avail-
able. Under this requirement, the government must in some way compel the contractor to
manufacture the product. "It is elementary that compulsion must exist before the 'government
contract defense' is available." Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295
F.2d 14, 16 (9th Cir. 1961) (no compulsion where contractor had discretion in building coffer-
dam); see also Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super 1, 8-9, 364 A.2d 43, 46-47 (1976)
(compulsion found where government contract specifically required manufacturer to exclude
certain safety equipment in construction ofjeep). Today, the compulsion requirement of the
government contractor defense has been uniformly rejected by the courts. See Brown v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 253-54 (3d Cir. 1982); Note, supra note 1. None of the
modem definitions of the defense include compulsion. See McKay, 704 F.2d at 451; Shaw, 778
F.2d at 746; In re Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1055.
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fense be available. 12 3
D. The Minority Rule: Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace
Corp. 12 4 embraced Judge Alarcon's McKay dissent and raised several
new issues to oppose the government contractor defense. The Shaw
court declined to accept the McKay court's formulation of the govern-
ment contractor defense and instead chose to establish its own version of
the defense.125 Unlike the other jurisdictions that have recognized some
form of the government contractor defense, the Eleventh Circuit did not
base its construction on either the Yearsley agency defense or the con-
tract specification defense. 126 Instead, the court cited traditional separa-
tion of powers doctrine127 as compelling the defense. 128 The Eleventh
Circuit quoted the district court in In re Agent Orange:
The purpose of a government contract defense.., is to permit
the government to wage war in whatever manner the govern-
123. The dissent specifically found that "inspection and approval do not constitute direction
or compulsion." McKay, 704 F.2d at 460 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
124. 778 F.2d 736 (1lth Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 106 S. Ct. 2243 (1986). At issue
in Shaw was the death of a Navy serviceman. Id. at 738. Lt. Gary Shaw was killed when the
aircraft he was piloting, a Grumman A-6 jet airplane, crashed into the Pacific Ocean only
seconds after launching from the aircraft carrier Constellation. Id. Although the body and
wreckage were not recovered, Navy investigators concluded that the most probable cause of
the crash was the loss or failure of a bolt in the aircraft's "stabilizer actuation system" or
"longitudinal flight control system." Id A malfunction in either of these systems would result
in the immediate loss of control of the aircraft. Id. The plaintiff, decedent's father, sued
Grumman on theories of negligence, breach of warranty and strict products liability. Id.
125. Id. at 745-46.
126. Id at 740; see supra notes 37-58 and accompanying text.
127. The Framers of our Constitution developed the doctrine of separation of powers to
prevent a single branch of the government from wielding total power unchecked by other
branches. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 119, 123 (1976). "The accumulation of all powers legis-
lative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, ... may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 244 (.
Madison) (Bantam Classic ed. 1982). Although the Constitution does not contemplate three
branches of government with precisely defined boundaries, one branch may not interfere with
another's constitutionally enumerated powers. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 962 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). Courts do not hesitate to enforce
this doctrine when "one branch has impaired or sought to assume a power central to another
branch." Id; see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 123.
In Boyle, the court was impairing the legislature's constitutionally mandated power to
raise and support armies by questioning the legislature's decisions relating to military equip-
ment and thus impairing the legislature's authority to support the military. U.S. CoNST. art. I,
§ 8, cls. 11-13. Just as courts have held that the President may not exercise legislative author-
ity belonging to the Congress, the judiciary cannot seek to infringe the exclusive powers of the
Congress. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 123.
128. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 743.
April 1988] GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
ment deems advisable, and to do so with the support of suppli-
ers of military weapons. Considerations of cost, time of
production, risks to participants, risks to third parties, and any
other factors that might weigh on the decisions of whether,
when, and how to use a particular weapon, are uniquely ques-
tions for the military and should be exempt from review by ci-
vilian courts. 129
The court relied solely on the concept of separation of powers to justify
the defense. 130
In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the four poli-
cies the Ninth Circuit raised in support of the government contractor
defense. 31 The first rationale provided that holding a government con-
tractor liable without regard to the government's involvement in the de-
sign process would subvert the Feres-Stencel doctrine.'32 Under this
reasoning, contractors would arguably pass through the costs of liability
insurance and the costs of litigation to the government by way of in-
creased contract prices.133 The government in effect would be indemni-
fying the military contractor in direct opposition to the holding in
Stencel Aero Engineering Co. v. United States.134 The Shaw court re-
jected this reasoning by stating that it "will not recognize a military con-
tractor defense simply to shield.., contractors-and (only arguably) the
government-from the cost of liability for defectively designed
products."'
135
The Shaw court next reviewed the second rationale cited in McKay.
This rationale addressed the problem of "thrust[ing] the judiciary into
the making of military decisions."' 36 Citing United States v. Shearer,
137
129. Id. at 740 (quoting In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1054 n. 1
(E.D.N.Y. 1982)). Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the government contract
defense is not limited only to those times when war is being waged. Id. The "country need not
be in combat for the defense to obtain." Id.
130. "[W]hen a knowing and purposeful decision to employ [a] product[ ] is made by the
military, the judiciary may not question it." Id. at 741 (footnote omitted).
131. Id.
132. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464
U.S. 1043 (1984); see supra notes 59-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Feres-
Stencel doctrine.
133. McKay, 704 F.2d at 449.
134. Id. The Supreme Court in Stencel held that the FTCA bars a third-party from suing
the United States for indemnity. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673
(1977).
135. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 742. The court reasoned that competition in the defense market
would deter contractors from passing the costs of liability onto the government. See McKay,
704 F.2d at 457 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
136. McKay, 704 F.2d at 449. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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the Eleventh Circuit held that the most important factor in determining
the availability of the government contractor defense was "whether the
suit requires the [civilian] court to second-guess military decisions."'' 38
The Shaw court stated that this second-guessing goes to the heart of clas-
sic separation of powers concerns. 139 The military must be given free-
dom to make decisions concerning the risks it is willing to take of
accidents and injuries when it designs military equipment.140 The court
pointed out that these decisions are to be made "without judicial interfer-
ence." 14 The Eleventh Circuit based its version of the government con-
tractor defense on this reasoning. 142
The McKay court's third rationale determined that holding contrac-
tors liable would impede the country's ability to "push technology to-
wards its limits."' 43 The Ninth Circuit realized that an unavoidable side
effect of pushing technology to its limits is that of incurring risks in ex-
cess of those acceptable for ordinary consumers.'" However, the Elev-
enth Circuit found that'military risk taking was fully protected under its
separation of powers theory and that there was no need to include it as a
separate rationale. 145
Next, the Shaw court considered the Ninth Circuit's final ration-
ale 146 of encouraging the government and its suppliers to work closely
together and thereby allow easier allocation of responsibility for design
decisions. 47 The Eleventh Circuit refused to consider this rationale and
137. 473 U.S. 52, 58 (1984). See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text for discussion of
Shearer.
138. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 742 (quoting United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985)). The
Eleventh Circuit adopted the Feres-Stencel doctrine in so far as it was restated and limited in
Shearer. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 742. Shearer held that the most important questions were whether
the suit would require civilian courts to second-guess military decisions and whether the suit
would impair military discipline. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit adopted
the first factor stated in Shearer, that the suit must require the court to second-guess military
decisions, but rejected the second Shearer factor of "whether the suit might impair essential
military discipline." Shaw, 778 F.2d at 742. The Eleventh Circuit asserted that "we think the
likelihood of any profound disruption of discipline is negligible from testimony in suits against
military contractors, we decline to rest either recognition or rejection of the defense on this
frail support." Id at 743.
139. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 742.
140. Id
141. Id
142. Id.
143. McKay, 704 F.2d at 450.
144. Id. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
145. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 743. "To adopt the new technology argument.., is not only to be
redundant, but also to invite unproductive quibbling over whether or not a particular product
is actually on the cutting edge." Id
146. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
147. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 743.
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referred to the Ninth Circuit's reasoning as "inscrutable."' 48 Rather, the
court stated that a close working relationship between the contractor and
the government would make identification of the responsible party more
difficult.1
49
In summary, the Eleventh Circuit recognized the availability of a
government contractor defense based solely on "the theory that the con-
stitutional separation of powers compels the judiciary to defer to a mili-
tary decision to use a weapon or weapons system... designed by an
independent contractor, despite its risks to servicemen."' 50 Under this
circuit's version of the defense, a government contractor can avoid liabil-
ity only if it affirmatively proves:
(1) that it did not participate, or participated only minimally, in
the design of those products or parts of products shown to be
defective; or (2) that it timely warned the military of the risks of
the design and notified it of alternative designs reasonably
known by the contractor, and that the military, although fore-
warned, clearly authorized the contractor to proceed with the
dangerous design.' 51
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Shaw is one of the strongest state-
ments to date against the expansion of the government contractor de-
fense. During a time when other circuits are rapidly expanding the
circumstances under which the defense is available, the Eleventh Circuit
is urging restraint. 5 2 The vitality of the expansionist views of the other
circuits, as well as the conservative ideals of the Eleventh Circuit, will be
a crucial conflict that the Supreme Court must address when it decides
the Boyle case.
With the background of the defense complete, the sections that fol-
low will discuss the government contract defense as it was applied in the
Boyle case. The discussion will conclude with a critical examination of
the Fourth Circuit's application of the four-prong government contractor
defense.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At issue in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. 53 was the death of a
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Ia.
151. Id. at 746 (emphasis in original).
152. See infra notes 254-64 and accompanying text for discussion of expansions of the de-
fense in the various circuits.
153. 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 872 (1987).
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Marine serviceman who died in the course of his military duties.15 4 On
April 27, 1983, during joint Navy-Marine training exercises, a Marine
helicopter155 and its four crew members crashed into the Atlantic Ocean
off the coast of Virginia Beach, Virginia. 156 Three of the crewmen es-
caped safely through the aircraft's emergency exits.157 Although unin-
jured by the crash, the co-pilot, Lt. David Boyle, drowned allegedly
because his escape hatch did not function properly.158
The helicopter was manufactured by Sikorsky Aircraft, a division of
United Technologies Corporation (Sikorsky). 5 9 The plaintiff, Delbert
Boyle (Boyle), father of the decedent, sued Sikorsky in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia."6 The plaintiff al-
leged negligence and breach of warranty in the design of the co-pilot's
emergency escape hatch and also in the rework of the helicopter's control
system. 161
At trial, the plaintiff asserted that Sikorsky performed faulty repairs
on the helicopter's pilot valve. 162 Plaintiff argued that Sikorsky inadver-
tently allowed a small wire chip to enter the pilot valve1 63 which caused
the servomechanism to malfunction.' 6  As a result, the pilot was unable
to control the aircraft and the helicopter crashed into the ocean. 165
Boyle also argued that the co-pilot's emergency escape hatch was
defectively designed by Sikorsky. 166 The plaintiff alleged that when the
co-pilot's collective 16 was in the full up position, it blocked the co-pilot's
egress through the emergency escape hatch.'
68
154. Id. at 414.
155. The helicopter was a Sikorsky CH-53D. The CH-53D is a large assault helicopter
designed for heavy use in transporting equipment and support personnel in amphibious assault
operations. Respondent's Brief at 1-2, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. (U.S. Oct., 1986)
(No. 86-492) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
156. Boyle, 792 F.2d at 414.
157. Id.
158. Id
159. Id.
160. Id at 413.
161. Id at 413-14.
162. Id. at 414.
163. The chip of wire could have been introduced into the pilot valve at one of three times:
during an overhaul that Sikorsky performed in late 1981 to early 1982; during Navy reworking
in 1982; or during maintenance of the hydraulic system by the Marine Corp. Id.
164. Id. The servomechanism is analogous to the power steering in an automobile. It as-
sists the pilot in flying the aircraft. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. The collective is one of the aircraft's control sticks. Id. Both the pilot and the co-pilot
in the CH-53D have a collective. Id.
168. Id
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The jury returned a general verdict for the plaintiff and awarded
him $725,000.169 Sikorsky, arguing that it was shielded from liability for
design defects by the government contractor defense, moved for a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict. 70 The district court denied the mo-
tion, and Sikorsky appealed. 71
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court and remanded
with directions to enter judgment for the defendant. 72 Unlike the dis-
trict court, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the government contractor de-
fense did apply in this case.173 The Fourth Circuit reversed because the
government contractor defense precluded liability for the design defect,
and because there was insufficient evidence to prove Sikorsky was the
party that introduced the wire chip into the pilot valve. 74
IV. REASONNG OF THE COURT
The Fourth Circuit had to resolve two issues.'75 The first was
whether Sikorsky could raise the government contractor defense to shield
itself from liability for the design of the escape hatch system.1 76 The
second was whether Sikorsky was responsible for the metal chip that was
found in the helicopter's servomechanism.
77
In deciding the first issue, the court relied on the four-prong test set
forth in Tozer v. LTV Corp. 171 Under the Tozer analysis, the court found
that a government contractor can avoid tort liability for a design defect
that causes injury if the contractor can prove that:
1) the United States is immune from liability;
2) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications
for the equipment;
3) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and
4) the supplier warned the United States about dangers in the
use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to
169. Id
170. Id
171. Id
172. Id
173. Id
174. Id
175. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986), cert granted, 107 S.
Ct. 872 (1987).
176. Id at 414.
177. Id at 415.
178. Id at 414. Although the court in essence used the same test as set forth in McKay v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984), the
court cited the prior Fourth Circuit decision of Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th
Cir.), petition for cert. filed (1986) as the source of the test. Boyle, 792 F.2d at 414.
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the United States.
1 79
The Fourth Circuit then applied the test to the facts of Boyle. The
court did not explicitly consider the first prong of the test, but instead
went directly into a discussion of the second and third prongs.'
To show the government's involvement in, and approval of, the heli-
copter's specifications, one of Sikorsky's managers testified concerning
the extensive back-and-forth discussions between the Navy and Sikor-
sky.18' The court held that these discussions between Sikorsky and the
government, combined with the government's approval of a mock-up of a
functional cockpit, satisfied the second and third prongs of the test.' 2 It
held that the Navy had approved reasonably detailed specifications of
the escape hatch and that the equipment conformed to those
specifications.
183
The fourth prong of the test was not addressed since the issue of
Sikorsky's duty to warn was never raised.' 84 The plaintiff failed to pro-
duce any evidence that Sikorsky possessed knowledge of dangers that the
Navy did not.' 85 Thus, the court concluded that Sikorsky had satisfied
the requirements of the government contractor defense, and therefore
could incur no liability for the allegedly defective escape hatch design. 18 6
The second issue of the wire chip was not addressed by the court
because the plaintiff could do no more than speculate as to how the metal
chip was introduced into the pilot valve. 187 As a result, the court con-
cluded that it "need not considerin this case the applicability of the mili-
tary contractor defense to questions of manufacture and overhaul,
because Sikorsky's liability can in no event be established."'
188
179. Boyle, 792 F.2d at 414.
180. Id The court probably did not consider the first prong because the decedent was a
member of the military and died in the line of duty. Under these facts, the United States
would clearly be immune from liability. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. Thus, the
first prong of the McKay test was satisfied.
181. Boyle, 792 F.2d at 414.
182. Id In reaching its holding, the Fourth Circuit referred to its prior decision in Tozer,
792 F.2d at 407, where it held that "this type of [back-and-forth] exchange of information will
normally suffice to establish government approval of the design in question." Boyle, 792 F.2d
at 414.
183. Boyle, 792 F.2d at 414-15.
184. Id. at 415.
185. Id
186. Id
187. Id
188. Id
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V. ANALYSIS
A. The Boyle Court's Application of The Four-Prong Test
The facts of Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. 189 are precisely those
that the court in McKay v. Rockwell International Corp. 190 visualized as
properly justifying a contractor's sharing of governmental immunity.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit correctly allowed Sikorsky to raise the de-
fense.1 91 If the court had held the defense inapplicable, the underlying
policies of the defense would have been subverted.
1. Policy reasons for the government contractor defense
First, barring the defense in Boyle would force Sikorsky to pass the
compensation costs onto the government. Sikorsky could pass these
costs on by invoking cost overrun provisions in current contracts, by
presenting higher bids on future equipment or by including liability in-
surance in subsequent price estimates. 19 2 Actions like these would result
in passing through the costs of the injury to the government which is
exactly the situation the Feres-Stencel doctrine was established to
prevent. 1
93
189. 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 872 (1987).
190. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
191. The Fourth Circuit in Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 406-08 (4th Cir. 1986),
petition for cert filed (1986), essentially adopted the reasoning underlying the government con-
tractor defense put forth by the Ninth Circuit in McKay, 704 F.2d at 449-50. See supra notes
96-105 and accompanying text.
192. See, eg., Tozer, 792 F.2d at 408; McKay, 704 F.2d at 449.
193. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. The pass-through of costs argument is,
today, the least persuasive of all the rationales offered to support the government contractor
defense. See Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 741-42 (11th Cir. 1985),
petition for cert. filed, 106 S. Ct. 2243 (1986). Under the pass-through of costs argument, if a
contractor is allowed to pass the costs of injuries onto the government, the contractor is in
effect getting indemnified by the government. Recovering from the government for indemnity
is specifically barred. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1976).
Today, most contracts between government contractors and the military probably already
include adjustments for the cost of potential tort liability. Ausness, supra note 55, at 1008. In
fact, the Supreme Court in Stencel explicitly recognized this practice. 431 U.S. at 674 n.8.
"The Stencel opinion's failure to condemn this practice reflects the [Supreme] Court's appreci-
ation for the realities which control in a free market system." McKay, 704 F.2d at 457 (Alar-
con, J., dissenting). As Judge Alarcon pointed out in his dissent in McKay, manufacturers
with good safety records will be able to obtain liability insurance at lower rates than "less
careful suppliers." Id (Alarcon, J., dissenting). The cost savings to these contractors will
enable them to make lower bids. Id (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Since the military is free to
choose the lowest bid, the result will be lower overall costs and greater contractor interest in
safety. Id (Alarcon, J., dissenting). In sum, "there is no doubt that some of these liability
costs will find their way into overall bid costs, this is to a certain extent inevitable. The free
market system, however, insures that this cost transfer will be minimized." Id. (Alarcon, J.,
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If the court in Boyle had held the defense inapplicable, it would
have "thrust the judiciary into the making of military decisions."' 94 The
court would have been required to review the specifications of the CH-53
helicopter and determine whether the design was unreasonably danger-
ous. However, "[w]hat would pose an unreasonable risk to the safety of
civilians might be acceptable-or indeed necessary-in light of the mili-
tary mission of the aircraft."' 195 Thus, the court would be forced to eval-
uate the adequacy of the escape system in light of the Navy's mission for
the CH-53. But, this review of military decision-making smacks of the
constitutional separation of powers problems that courts have refused to
consider since the time of Feres v. United States.
96
Further, barring the government contractor defense would shift the
Navy's risks of pushing technology towards its limits from the govern-
dissenting). For these reasons, the cost pass-through rationale alone does not justify a rule that
grants military contractors immunity from liability for design defects.
194. McKay, 704 F.2d at 449.
195. Tozer, 792 F.2d at 406. As the Fifth Circuit concluded, "it is the needs of national
defense, not accident costs, that must be the ultimate standard by which the purchase of mili-
tary equipment is measured." Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 575 (5th Cir. 1985). The
military must be free to establish the specifications for military equipment in light of the mis-
sion the equipment is to be used for, not for the products safe use. Id.
196. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). See United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954) (explaining
Feres). The decisions after McKay have confirmed that today the primary rationale underlying
the government contractor defense is the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. Pomer-
ance, McKay v. Rockwell Revisited: The Future of The Government Contractor Defense, 20
BEVERLY HILLS B.J. 217, 219 (1986). Appellate courts that have recognized the government
contractor defense have almost uniformly held the most important justification of the defense
is separation of powers concerns. See Tozer, 792 F.2d at 405; Bynum, 770 F.2d at 565; In re
Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Germany, 769 F.2d 115, 121 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1082 (1986), reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 1636 (1987). In particular, the Eleventh Circuit has
held the "military contractor defense in this Circuit [is] based exclusively on the theory... [of]
constitutional separation of powers .... " Shaw, 778 F.2d at 743. The Eleventh Circuit went
on to point out that separation of powers "compels the judiciary to defer to a military decision
to use a weapon or weapons system.., designed by an independent contractor, despite its risks
to servicemen." Id at 743.
Considerations regarding military decisions as to the design and specification of weapons
systems "are uniquely questions for the military and should be exempt from review of civilian
courts." In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1054 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
For if the judiciary is allowed to scrutinize military decisions, can it be long before the courts
will be ordering the recall of military equipment? Moreover, "what would have been the effect
of a judicial order prohibiting the armed forces from deploying Agent Orange in Vietnam
because of the danger it presented to servicemen in the field?" Sharing the Protective Cloak,
supra note 48, at 187-88. These questions go to the heart of separation of powers concerns and
it is for these reasons that the defense was formulated. See supra note 127 and accompanying
text for discussion of separation of powers concerns. After all, the true purpose of the govern-
ment contractor defense "is to permit the government to wage war in whatever manner the
government deems advisable ... " In re Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1054 n.1.
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ment to Sikorsky. 9 7 The military, in designing equipment to perform a
particular mission, may be willing to accept risks that ordinary consum-
ers might consider to be unacceptable.19 Since manufacturers of mili-
tary equipment are regularly unable to negotiate with the government to
minimize such risks, an unfair burden is placed on the contractor. 99 Si-
korsky would bear the onus of the risks the Navy was willing to take in
designing the CH-53 to perform its mission, even though such risks may
be well beyond those acceptable in civilian products.
Finally, without the government contract defense, fewer "incentives
for suppliers of military equipment to work closely with and to consult
the military authorities in the development and testing of equipment"2"
would exist. In the Boyle case, Sikorsky would have less incentive to
continue the back-and-forth dialogue it had established with the Navy,
and as a result, a "valuable part of... [the procurement] process" would
be lost.2"1 As the Fourth Circuit pointed out, "if military technology is
to continue to incorporate the advances of science, it needs the uninhib-
ited assistance of private contractors."2 "2 Consequently, dialogue be-
tween the government and its contractors must be encouraged.
All of the essential underlying rationales of the government contrac-
tor defense were fulfilled in Boyle. Conferring immunity in such a case
protected vital government interests. Consequently, allowing Sikorsky to
raise the defense ensured that the policies advanced by the separation of,
powers and sovereign immunity doctrines are not undermined by law-
suits like the instant case.
2. Applying the McKay four-part test
The question now turns to whether all the elements of the govern-
ment contractor defense were satisfied in Boyle.
a. governmental immunity prong
The first prong of the McKay test requires, as a preliminary matter,
that the United States be immune from liability.20 3 The Fourth Circuit
did not discuss this prong in the Boyle opinion. However, it is evident
from the facts that the prong is satisfied. The United States' sovereign
197. McKay, 704 F.2d at 449.
198. Id. at 450.
199. Id
200. Id.
201. Tozer, 792 F.2d at 407.
202. Ia
203. Boyle, 792 F.2d at 414. The four prong test cited by the court in Boyle is essentially
the test set forth in McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
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immunity is not waived unless the action is authorized under the
FTCA.2° The FTCA contains an exception for military personnel that
prohibits members of the military from recovering under the act for inju-
ries sustained in the line of duty.2" 5 This exception, combined with the
holding of Feres v. United States,20 6 precludes a member of the armed
forces from bringing suit against the government for tortious conduct.2 °7
In the Boyle case, Lt. Boyle was a member of the United States
Marines who died in the line of duty. Thus, a suit against the United
States would be barred by the FTCA because the government did not
waive its immunity for such actions.208 As a result, the United States is
immune from liability and the first prong of the test is satisfied.
b. approval prong
The second prong requires the government to have "approved rea-
sonably precise specifications for the equipment. '20 9 To satisfy this
prong, the McKay court required either that the United States had set the
specifications for the equipment or approved the contractor's final, rea-
sonably detailed specifications "by examining and agreeing to a detailed
description of the workings of the system."21 0 According to McKay, the
specifications provided by the United States had to be more than mere
general outlines of the equipment's performance.21'
The degree of government involvement necessary to satisfy this ele-
ment of the defense is an area of conflict among the federal circuit courts
of appeals.21 2 The reasoning underlying this prong of the government
contractor defense is to ensure that the government is sufficiently in-
volved in the design process so as to justify conferring immunity on the
contractor.
In finding this prong satisfied, the Fourth Circuit pointed to the
"back-and-forth discussions between Sikorsky and the Navy" in prepar-
ing the design specifications for the CH-53 helicopter.213 The court
stated it had previously held that "this type of exchange of information
204. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
205. 28 U.S.C. § 2680G) (1983).
206. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text for discussion of government immunity
from suit by members of the military.
208. 28 U.S.C. § 26800).
209. Boyle, 792 F.2d at 414.
210. McKay, 704 F.2d at 453.
211. Id.
212. See infra notes 251-63 and accompanying text.
213. Boyle, 792 F.2d at 414.
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. .. [would] suffice to establish government approval of the design in
question." '214 In addition, the court pointed out that Sikorsky built a
mock-up of the helicopter's cockpit with all the instruments and con-
trols, "including the collective and the emergency escape hatch."
2 15
Since the mock-up was inspected and approved by the Navy, the court's
conclusion that the second prong was satisfied is even more persuasive.216
Critics of the liberal construction of the defense adopted in some
jurisdictions will argue that merely developing a dialogue with the gov-
ernment falls short of the McKay court's requirements for the approval
prong. However, if the back-and-forth dialogue between the government
and the military contractor is continuous and consists of more than a
"mere rubber stamp"21 ' by the government, the approval requirement is
held satisfied. 218 This back-and-forth contact is recognized as a valuable
part of the defense procurement process and should be encouraged by
making the government contract defense available to manufacturers that
work closely with the government. Since the key requirement of this
prong is government involvement in the design process, a continuous
back-and-forth discussion of design specifications between the govern-
ment and the contractor would satisfy the requirement.
The Fourth Circuit has not -made an undue expansion of the second
prong of the defense in allowing the dialogue between Sikorsky and the
government to satisfy the approval prong. Rather, the court has framed
the approval requirement in terms of the realities of the government pro-
curement process.2 9 By endorsing this construction of the second prong
of the test, the Fourth Circuit furthers one of the fundamental rationales
underlying the existence of the government contractor defense. Allowing
the defense "provides incentives for suppliers of military equipment to
work closely with and to consult the military authorities in the develop-
ment and testing of equipment. ' 220 Thus, the approval prong of the Mc-
214. Id. The Fourth Circuit was referring to the holding in Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol,
755 F.2d 352, 355 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985), where the Third Circuit held
that a "continuous back-and-forth" discussion between the military and the contractor would
satisfy the government participation requirement. Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 355.
215. Boyle, 792 F.2d at 414.
216. Ido In In re Air Crash Disaster, 769 F.2d at 123, government inspection and approval
of mock-ups and prototypes was held to satisfy the government approval prong of the govern-
ment contractor defense. Id.
217. In re Air Crash Disaster, 769 F.2d at 122.
218. See Tozer, 792 F.2d at 407-08; In re Air Crash Disaster, 769 F.2d at 122; Koutsoubos,
755 F.2d at 355.
219. For a discussion of the steps involved in the procurement process for the design of a
major weapons system see, Amici Brief, supra note 49, at 6.
220. McKay, 704 F.2d at 450. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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Kay test is properly satisfied.
c. conformance prong
The third prong of the McKay test requires that the equipment con-
form to specifications the government has established or approved.22'
This prong of the test is very straightforward and has not been the sub-
ject of any substantial conflict between the circuits. As the McKay court
indicated, if the manufacturer deviated from the equipment's design
specifications, the third prong of the test will not be satisfied.222 Since
the equipment does not conform to the government specifications, the
defense does not apply. An injury caused by a deviation from the manu-
facturing specifications, as opposed to an injury resulting from a defect in
the equipment's design, will not confer immunity on a contractor.223
"To hold otherwise would remove the incentive from manufacturers to
use all cost-justified means to conform to government specifications in
the manufacture of military equipment."224 In an action for a manufac-
turing defect, no policy decision of the government is called into ques-
tion. Thus, no issue arises that would require a "civilian court to second-
guess [a] military decision[ ]... ,,,225 and therefore no need to invoke the
government contractor defense.
In Boyle, the Navy worked closely with Sikorsky with continuous
back-and-forth discussions. Moreover, the Navy approved a fully
equipped mock-up of the cockpit. If the Navy found that Sikorsky had
not complied with the helicopter's specifications, the Navy surely would
have objected. Since the plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence of Si-
korsky's deviation from the specifications, the Fourth Circuit was correct
in holding that the defendant had met its burden of proof for the third
prong of the defense.226
d. duty to warn prong
The final element of the defense requires the contractor to warn the
government of dangers in the operation of the equipment that are known
to the contractor but not to the government.227 This prong of the defense
has been subject to several different interpretations by the various cir-
221. Boyle, 792 F.2d at 414.
222. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
223. Id.; see Bynum, 770 F.2d at 574.
224. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
225. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (citation omitted).
226. Boyle, 792 F.2d at 414-15.
227. Ia at 414.
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cuits. 2 2 8 Under the McKay standard,22 9 the duty to warn is construed to
be limited to those cases where the contractor had actual knowledge of
the dangerous condition.230
In Boyle, the plaintiff had the burden of producing evidence to show
Sikorsky possessed knowledge pertaining to the reliability of the escape
hatch of which the government was not aware. However, the plaintiff
did not meet this burden because he failed to produce evidence that Si-
korsky was aware of hidden dangers in the escape system.231 Therefore,
"Sikorsky's duty to warn the Navy of any hazards known to it but not to
the Navy was thus not brought into question.
232
The Fourth Circuit properly concluded that the government con-
tractor defense precluded Sikorsky from being held liable for the alleged
defects in the design of the helicopter's emergency escape hatch. The
court found that Sikorsky had affirmatively established each of the four
prongs of the test.233 As a result, the Fourth Circuit correctly conferred
immunity on Sikorsky for the design of the escape system.234
B. Proposal for New Form of Government Contractor Defense
In view of the policies underlying the government contractor de-
fense, every circuit that has considered the issue of military contractor
liability has ruled that some version of the defense is essential to prevent
civilian courts from second-guessing military decisions.235 Thus, the
question before the Supreme Court in Boyle will be the dimensions of the
defense.
1. Government immunity prong
The first prong of the government contractor defense requires that
the government be immune from liability under the Feres-Stencel doc-
228. See infra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
229. The McKay standard is the standard adopted by the Fourth Circuit. Tozer, 792 F.2d
at 408.
230. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451. See Bynum, 770 F.2d at 574; In re Air Crash Disaster, 769
F.2d at 124-25.
231. Boyle, 792 F.2d at 415.
232. Id
233. Id. at 413.
234. The court did not consider whether Sikorsky was negligent during an overhaul in al-
lowing a wire chip to enter the helicopter's pilot valve. Boyle, 792 F.2d at 415. The court held
that the plaintiff could do little more than speculate as to how the chip was introduced into the
pilot valve. Id. As the court pointed out, "evidence must prove more than a probability of
negligence." Id. at 416. Thus, the Fourth Circuit refused to consider the "applicability of the
military contractor defense to questions of manufacture and overhaul." Id. at 415.
235. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
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trine.2 36 Immunity under the Feres-Stencel doctrine is limited to barring
claims against the United States by military personnel for injuries they
sustained in the line of duty.237 If the plaintiff is a member of the mili-
tary and sustains a service-related injury, the United States is immune
from liability and the first prong is clearly satisfied. This is the classic
factual setting in which the government contractor defense has been
properly raised.23 Application of the defense becomes much more diffi-
cult if the plaintiff is an ordinary civilian.239
When an ordinary civilian brings a tort action, the Feres-Stencel
doctrine does not apply.24° Since the government contractor defense de-
rives its primary justification from the Feres-Stencel doctrine,241 allowing
the defense to be raised in a suit brought by a civilian plaintiff would not
further any of the policies underlying the defense.242 Thus, making the
236. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1043 (1984). The Feres-Stencel doctrine provides the government with immunity from
either direct suits brought by members of the military for service related injuries, or actions for
indemnity by contractors seeking to recover damages paid, resulting from those same injuries.
See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 59-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of government immunity
under the FTCA and the Feres-Stencel doctrine.
238. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 872 (1987); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1985);
Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 738 (1 1th Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed,
106 S. Ct. 2243 (1986); McKay, 704 F.2d at 446.
239. Asselta & Fitzpatrick, Government Contractor Defense, 28 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 1, 36
(1984) (article by co-counsel of record for seminal case of McKay discussing application of
government contractor defense); Ausness, supra note 55, at 1017; Craft, The Government Con-
tractor Defense: Evolution and Evaluation, in THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE: A
FAIR DEFENSE OR THE CONTRACTOR'S SHIELD? at 44 (J. Madole ed. 1986); Pomerance,
supra note 196, at 224 (question is whether the defense can be extended to shield contractors
from liability where a military or quasi-military product injures ordinary civilians).
240. Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 358 (D. Kan. 1983) (civilian employees of
aircraft manufacturer injured by ionizing radiation originating from radioactive compounds
used to coat faces of aircraft instruments). "Feres immunity has no relevance to this lawsuit
... since the injured individuals were not servicemen." Id.; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1983)
(statutes waiving governmental immunity to tort claims by civilians); Ausness, supra note 55,
at 1017 (Feres only applies to service-related injuries and would not necessarily bar non-deriva-
tive civilian claims); Craft, supra note 239, at 45 (if civilian brings tort action, Feres-Stencel
concern over military discipline or veterans compensation would arguably not arise).
241. Pomerance, supra note 196, at 224 ("legal justification for the government contractor
defense is the government's immunity to suits by servicemen" (emphasis in original)). See
supra note 95 and accompanying text.
242. Barring the defense under these circumstances would not result in unfairness to the
contractor. If the government was negligent in making the equipment's specifications and the
contractor reasonably followed the specifications, the contractor can implead or cross-claim
against the United States for indemnity or contribution, or be relieved of liability altogether.
Craft, supra note 239, at 45. Claims by the contractor against the government are not pre-
cluded by the holding in Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977).
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defense available in cases involving ordinary civilian plaintiffs would un-
warrantably overextend the defense and would "wholly repudiate the
Feres-Stencel doctrine."" a Moreover, allowing contractors to escape lia-
bility to civilian plaintiffs in these cases would give the contractors
greater immunity than the government currently enjoys.2 44
However, when a civilian plaintiff is an employee of the government
and "play[s] an integral role in military activities" with an associated
reasonably foreseeable increased risk of danger, an exception to this rule
should be created."4 5 In the McKay decision, the Ninth Circuit explicitly
acknowledged that members of the military are not ordinary consumers,
and that their expectations of safety are much lower than those of civil-
ians.246 As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that normal products liability
principles did not apply to members of the armed forces.2 4 7 The Ninth
Circuit's reasoning applies to cases where the civilian is intimately in-
volved with the military and can be reasonably expected to foresee the
greater risk of danger.24 8 Thus, when a civilian holds a close relationship
with the military and knowingly accepts heightened risks, a military con-
tractor may arguably raise the government contractor defense.2 49
The construction of the government immunity prong should be very
strict. Except for the cases where the civilian plaintiff is closely associ-
ated with the military and is reasonably aware of the greater risks in-
243. Pomerance, supra note 196, at 224.
244. Id. at 224-25. The government is liable for its torts to civilians under the FTCA. 28
U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1983).
245. United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2069 n.1 1 (1987). The Johnson Court held
that where a civilian employee of the government plays an integral role in military activities,
"an inquiry into the civilian activities would have the same effect on military discipline as a
direct inquiry into military judgments." Id This second-guessing of military judgment is one
of the primary rationales for the development of the Feres-Stencel doctrine. See supra notes
86-89 and accompanying text. Allowing the government contractor defense under those cir-
cumstances would further the defense's underlying policies.
246. McKay, 704 F.2d at 453. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that members of the military
must "recognize when they join the armed forces that they may be exposed to grave risks of
danger .... This is part of the job." Id.
247. Id. at 451.
248. Pomerance, supra note 196, at 225.
249. An example of the application of this exception to the general rule, that the govern-
ment contractor defense applies only to members of the military, is the explosion of the space
shuttle Challenger. Although the seven members of the NASA crew were not military person-
nel, they were employed by the government and must have been aware of the increased risks
associated with their jobs. In this situation, the crew were more than mere ordinary consum-
ers and the government contractor defense should be available. Pomerance, supra note 196, at
222-25 (discussion of applicability of government contractor defense to the space shuttle); see
also L.A. Times, Jan. 4, 1988, at 12, col. 3 (discussing pending litigation involving Morton
Thiokol, the government contractor who manufactured defective booster rocket for space
shuttle).
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volved, the availability of the defense must be restricted to those
instances where the plaintiff is a member of the military.250 Only under
these conditions could the underlying justification for the government
contractor defense be fulfilled. Thus, in the proposed test for the availa-
bility of the defense, the first prong is only satisfied if the plaintiff is a
member of the military or is closely associated with the military and con-
scious of the risks involved.251
2. Approval prong
The second prong of the test requires that the government establish
or approve reasonably precise specifications for the equipment in ques-
tion.252 This prong of the test specifies the degree of government involve-
ment necessary to justify sharing the government's immunity with the
contractor. Prior to the McKay decision, the standard was whether the
government "established the specifications" for the product.253 McKay
extended this definition to include cases where the government "reviewed
and approved a detailed set of specifications." '254
The "reasonably detailed" specifications requirement has been the
area of most expansion in the post-McKay decisions. The Third Circuit
has held that a "continuous back-and-forth" dialogue between the gov-
250. The defense would also be available where someone was suing derivatively on behalf of
a member of the military. Ausness, supra note 55, at 1017 n.263.
251. A possible solution to restricting the interpretation of the government immunity prong
is to excise it completely as an element of the defense and merely place a restriction on who a
contractor may raise the defense against. See, eg., Amici Brief, supra note 49, at 18-19 n.4
(discussion of unnecessary and confusing nature of first prong of McKay test). This is similar
to the version of the government contractor defense formulated by the District Court for the
Eastern District of New York. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (products liability action by families of Vietnam servicemen exposed to defo-
liant Agent Orange). The In re Agent Orange decision was the first time the elements of the
government contractor defense were specifically set out. The court held that for the defense to
apply, the defendant, Dow Chemical Co., had to prove:
1. That the government established the specifications for "Agent Orange";
2. That the "Agent Orange" manufactured by the defendant met the government's
specifications in all material respects; and
3. That the government knew as much as or more than the defendant about the
hazards to people that accompanied the use of "Agent Orange."
Id This is the version of the government contractor defense adopted by the Third Circuit.
Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 355.
Although the In re Agent Orange court did not explicitly restrict the defense to members
of the military, the particular facts of the case imply the constraint. Thus, under this formula-
tion of the defense, a government contractor will not be allowed to raise the defense unless the
plaintiff is a member of the service or is a civilian who has a special relationship with the
military.
252. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
253. In re Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1055 (emphasis added).
254. McKay, 704 F.2d at 450 (emphasis added).
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ernment and the contractor is sufficient to satisfy the approval require-
ment.255  The Third Circuit went on to hold that "so long as the
government's approval consists of more than a mere rubber stamp," the
approval requirement will be satisfied even if the contractor originated
the majority of the specifications.2 56
The Fourth Circuit has taken a particularly liberal view of the speci-
fications requirement. Of the three most recent decisions issued by the
Fourth Circuit, Dowd v. Textron, Inc. 2 57 may possess the greatest expan-
sion of the government contractor defense since McKay.258 All that is
required under Dowd for the approval requirement to be satisfied is that
the government use the product for a certain amount of time. Under this
255. Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352, 355 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 821
(1985). The Third Circuit re-affirmed the decision in Koutsoubos in In re Air Crash Disaster at
Mannheim Germany, 769 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986),
reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 1636 (1987). "[G]overnment approval of specifications developed
through a continuous series of negotiations between the contractor and the military satisfied
... [the approval requirement]." Id. at 122.
256. In re Air Crash Disaster, 769 F.2d at 122. This concept has recently received support
in the Fourth Circuit, "It]he contractor's participation in design--or even its origination of
specifications-does not constitute a waiver of the government contractor defense." Tozer v.
LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 407 (4th Cir.),petition for cert. filed (1986). Further, a district court
in Texas has ruled that mere acceptance of the completed product may be enough to satisfy the
approval requirement. Hendrix v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1551, 1557
(N.D. Tex. 1986).
257. 792 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1986). In Dowd, the decedent was killed when his helicopter
crashed during an instructional flight. The plaintiff alleged that the crash resulted from the
hub of the rotor system striking the mast and severing it, a phenomenon known as "mast
bumping." Id. at 410. The helicopter involved in the crash had a 540 rotor system that the
defendant Bell designed in the early 1960's. Id. Plaintiff argued that since Bell originated the
design of the 540 rotor system in the early 1960's without Army participation, that the second
prong of the McKay test was not satisfied inasmuch as the government neither set or approved
reasonably detailed specifications. IaL at 412. The manufacturer argued that although it had
originated the design for the rotor system, the Army's experience with the system was suffi-
cient to fulfill the approval requirement. Id. The court also pointed out that a large amount of
subsequent history existed. Id. The Army used helicopters with the 540 rotor system for
twenty years before the accident in question. Id The Army itself had investigated the mast
bumping in the early 1970's, discussed the problem in detail with Bell, and produced two
reports on the dangers of inflight mast bumping. Id
The Dowd court held that the second prong of the McKay test, 704 F.2d at 451, was
satisfied by "[t]he length and breadth of the Army's experience with the 540 rotor system-
and its decision to continue using it ...." Dowd, 792 F.2d at 412. The Army's continued use
of the product "amply establish[ed] government approval of the alleged design defects." Id
The Fourth Circuit held that "[t]he decision of the United States Army to contract with Bell
for a helicopter rotor system with which the Army had extensive familiarity and field experi-
ence operates to shield defendant from any liability for alleged design defects in that system."
Id at 410. Thus, for the first time, the government's past experience with a product was held
as satisfying the approval requirement of the McKay test.
258. Scantlebury, The Government Contract Defense: Alive and Well in The Fourth Circuit,
XXII TORT & INs. L.J. 268, 277 (1987).
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reasoning, a contractor could originate its own design without any gov-
ernment involvement and still meet the approval requirement. As long
as a reasonable amount of time passes before an injury occurs, the con-
tractor has satisfied the approval requirement. Moreover, a defense at-
torney could argue that with Dowd as a precedent, the approval
requirement could be held satisfied by merely showing the government's
past experience with similar products rather than with the actual product
in question.
This expansion by the Fourth Circuit is too liberal and goes far be-
yond the approval requirement contemplated by the Ninth Circuit in
McKay. After all, the primary rationale justifying extending the govern-
ment's immunity to a military contractor is the government's actual in-
volvement in the specifications for the design of the equipment. If this
involvement becomes too minimal or too far removed, no justification
exists for holding the military contractor immune from liability.259
The recent expansions of the approval requirement in the Third and
Fourth Circuits are precursors of a trend in the appellate courts toward a
very liberal construction of the government contractor defense. By con-
struing the defense in such a broad manner, contractors receive immu-
nity in circumstances where the government's involvement is so minimal
that no danger exists that judicial review would frustrate constitutional
separation of powers principles.260 A contractor would be given immu-
nity in situations where it was solely responsible for the defective de-
sign.261 As a result, contractors might be held immune in situations that
are clearly outside those contemplated when the defense was first
formulated.
The appellate courts should return to the principles set forth by the
Ninth Circuit in McKay. The second prong of the test should be satisfied
only when the contractor proves that the government either "estab-
62 1 26326lished' 2  or "approved ' I reasonably precise specifications. 2 4  Ex-
259. "The defense is available so long as there is true government participation in the de-
sign." In re Air Crash Disaster, 769 F.2d at 122.
260. In particular, the civilian court would not be required to second-guess military deci-
sions, because the contractor and not the government would be making the design decisions.
See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
261. Such a policy would encourage underhanded dealings with the government. Contrac-
tors might try to pass defectively designed equipment onto the government in the hope that the
equipment would be accepted and used. Once the government had used the equipment, the
contractor would argue that it is relieved from liability under the Dowd decision.
262. The defense is available without government approval if the government established
the specifications. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451. For this requirement to be satisfied, however, the
government must have provided more than "only minimal or very general requirements" for
the equipment. Id. at 450.
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tending immunity in other circumstances would not further the
underlying policies of the defense.
3. Conformance prong
The third prong of the test requires that the equipment conform to
the government's specifications.265 This prong of the McKay test is ex-
plicit and has not been the subject of dissension among the appellate cir-
cuits.2 66 Failure to comply with the government's expert judgment as to
how the equipment should be manufactured requires that the contractor
be held accountable for any injuries caused by its deviations.2 67 Accord-
ingly, this prong of the test should be left intact.
4. Duty to warn prong
The fourth prong of the McKay test requires the contractor to dis-
close any known dangers involved in the use of the equipment of which
the government is unaware. 261 "The primary purpose of this require-
ment is to enable the government to make determinations as to the design
and use of military equipment based on all readily available informa-
tion.12 69 With full disclosure by the contractor, the government's deci-
sion to adhere to a design may be assumed to indicate the government's
choice to accept the risks of the product.2
The majority of the circuits have adopted an actual knowledge stan-
263. The term "approved" is defined to include only those situations where the government
has reviewed the specifications and approved them. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451. This standard
should be applied with the requirement that the approval must amount to "more than a mere
rubber stamp" by the government to be valid. In re Air Crash Disaster, 769 F.2d at 122.
264. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451. The requirement set forth in In re Agent Orange, 1046 F.
Supp. at 1055, that the government must have established the specifications for the equipment
is too restrictive in light of the present day defense procurement process. Active participation
by the defense contractor is now accepted as a required vital part of the development of any
complex military system. As a result, the appellate courts have properly held that the govern-
ment contractor defense should also apply when the government has reviewed and approved
the contractor's specifications. In re Air Crash Disaster, 769 F.2d at 122; McKay, 704 F.2d at
450.
265. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
266. See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
267. The government contractor defense does not relieve contractors from liability for man-
ufacturing defects. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
268. Id
269. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 574 (5th Cir. 1985).
270. Ausness, supra note 55, at 1026. "A supplier should not be insulated from liability for
damages that would never have occurred if the military had been apprised of hazards known to
the supplier." In re Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1055. The district court went on to hold
that a contractor has a duty to inform the government of known risks "so as to provide the
military with at least an opportunity fairly to balance the weapon's risks and benefits." I
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dard.2 71 Under this standard, the contractor is only under a duty to dis-
close hazards of which it had actual knowledge.272 As pointed out in In
re Agent Orange, a contractor under this duty would not be required to
perform additional testing that is not included in the product's specifica-
tions.273 The duty merely requires the contractor to disclose to the gov-
ernment the extent of the contractor's knowledge of the dangers of the
product.
274
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in Shaw adopted a "should have
known" test.2 75 To avoid liability, a contractor must prove that it partic-
ipated only minimally in the design of the equipment. If the contractor
fails to meet this burden, it can only avoid liability by proving that it
both warned the government of the product's risks and that it informed
the government of any design alternatives "reasonably known to the
contractor.
276
The "should have known" test of Shaw will result in judicial review
of military decisions, and as such would violate the basic policies under-
lying the government contractor defense.277 This view was asserted by
the Fifth Circuit in Bynum.278 There, the court held that a "should have
known" test would require contractors to reevaluate the government's
design specifications and to engage in testing that was not mandated
271. Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 354; Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 415
(4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 872 (1987); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 599
(7th Cir. 1985); Bynum, 770 F.2d at 575 n.28; In re Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1055.
272. The circuits have held that contractors have no duty to warn of dangers known to both
the contractor and the government. Tillett, 756 F.2d at 599 (no duty to warn of dangers in use
of front end loader of which government was already aware); In re Air Crash Disaster, 769
F.2d at 124 (no duty to warn of hazards in helicopter's transmission of which government was
already aware). If the level of knowledge between the government and the contractor "is at
least in balance," the contractor is shielded from liability by the government contractor de-
fense. In re Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1055.
273. In re Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1055.
274. Id.
275. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746 (1Ith Cir. 1985), petition for
cert. filed, 106 S. Ct. 2243 (1986).
276. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held that "[a] risk is reasonably known when it is either
actually known, or reasonably ought to be known given good design practice in the industry."
Id The court pointed out that reasonable knowledge does not amount to a requirement of
omniscience. Id
277. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 576. A court hearing a case under this standard would be forced
to evaluate the adequacy of the government's testing program and to determine whether the
contractor was under a duty to engage in testing beyond that required in the government
contract. Thus, the court would be reviewing decisions the military had made regarding the
immediate need for a product, which would compel the contractor to perform only minimal
testing, or review military decisions relating to the development costs of a particular system.
278. Id
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under the government contract. 9 The reevaluations and further testing,
the court continued, would cause delays and increased costs that the gov-
ernment did not anticipate. 280 After all, the court held, "[w]hen to re-
quire additional testing of military equipment, and at what cost, are
decisions that are better left to the military and the political branches of
the government. 281
Although most circuits presently hold the contractor to have only a
duty to disclose hazards actually known to the contractor, it is not an
unreasonable burden to require contractors also to adhere to the first part
of the Shaw "should have known" test. Contractors should be required
to disclose hazards of which they have actual knowledge and to reveal
hazards that reasonably should be known given the standards of the in-
dustry in which they are working.
No reason exists why a contractor should not be held to the mini-
mum level of knowledge and skill in its particular industry. However,
the difficulty with applying the Shaw court's test as written is that it de-
fines "industry" to include both civilian and military industry. 28 2 Under
this standard, a court may be forced to evaluate the practices of military
industry which would conflict with constitutional separation of powers
doctrine. 283 To avoid this problem, "industry" in the proposed test will
refer to civilian industry. Thus, the fourth prong of the McKay test
should be expanded to include the duty to warn of hazards reasonably
known, given the good design practices of the civilian defense
industry.28 4
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. Another problem with the Shaw test is that it requires contractors to inform the
military of alternative designs which are reasonably known to the contractor. Shaw, 778 F.2d
at 746. This would compel the government contractor to expend valuable resources in deter-
mining alternate designs which the government may have already found to be inadequate in
light of the equipment's mission. The contractor will become, in essence, a reviewer of the
military's safety decisions, and consequently the courts will become reviewers of the contrac-
tor's findings. But, as pointed out by the district court in In re Agent Orange, the military's
decisions pertaining to the production, risks, and costs of a weapon are exempt from review by
civilian courts. In re Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1054 n.l. To adopt this part of the Shaw
test will result in courts examining these very decisions. Thus, this part of the Shaw test is in
conflict with the basic principles justifying the existence of the government contractor defense.
282. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 746 n.17.
283. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
284. This construction of the fourth prong does not include the associated increased costs
inherent in the Eleventh Circuit's formulation. See supra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
Under the proposed standard, the government contractor is held to disclose those hazards of
which the contractor has actual knowledge as well as those hazards that any competent con-
tractor would be aware of. The contractor is not compelled to research alternate designs as is
required by the Eleventh Circuit's test. Id.
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The proposed test for the availability of the government contractor
defense is summarized as follows:
1) The plaintiff is a member of the military or is a civilian
who has a special relationship with the military;
2) the government must have established or approved
reasonably precise specifications for the equipment in question;
3) the equipment must conform in all material respects
to the government's specifications;
4) the contractor must warn the government about dan-
gers in the equipment of which the contractor has actual
knowledge as well as dangers that reasonably should be known,
given the standards of the civilian industry in which the con-
tractor is working.
Under the proposed test, the defense will continue to protect the policy
decisions of the military from being second-guessed by civilian courts,
while preventing military contractors from sharing in the government's
immunity when those policies are not brought into question. 285
285. Applying the proposed test to the Boyle case is straightforward. The first prong, the
governmental immunity requirement, is satisfied because the decedent, Lt. Boyle, was a mem-
ber of the military and died in the line of duty. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
The second prong requires the government to have established or approved the equipment's
specifications. Sikorsky easily satisfied this prong by maintaining continuous back-and-forth
discussions with the government during the design of the helicopter and by obtaining the gov-
ernment's approval of a fully detailed mock-up of the helicopter's cockpit. See supra notes
213-15.
The third prong of the test requires that the equipment must conform materially to the
government's specifications. Satisfaction of this requirement can be implied from the govern-
ment's acceptance of the detailed full scale mock-up of the helicopter's cockpit. If there were
material differences between the government's specifications and the mock-up, the government
surely would have objected when it inspected the mock-up.
The last requirement is the duty to warn prong. Under the proposed test, the government
contractor is held not only to disclose those dangers of which it has actual knowledge but also
those that a reasonably competent contractor would know given the standards of the particular
industry. To prove that the contractor has not satisfied this prong, the plaintiff has the burden
of producing evidence showing that the contractor's duty has not been met. See supra notes
229-30. However, as the Fourth Circuit pointed out, the plaintiff in the Boyle case failed to
produce any evidence that would tend to show that Sikorsky failed to disclose knowledge of
dangers of which the government was not aware. Id. Unless the plaintiff could have shown
that other manufacturers of helicopters would hive been aware of hazards in the escape sys-
tem, this prong would be held satisfied by default.
Unless the plaintiff can show some failure of Sikorsky to live up to the standards of its
industry to warn of design hazards, all four prongs of the proposed test are satisfied. Sikorsky
can properly raise the government contractor defense and share in the government's sovereign
immunity.
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VI. PLAINTIFFS UNDER THE PROPOSED TEST
The final question to be considered is the remedy plaintiffs are left
with after a military contractor successfully raises the government con-
tractor defense. After all, if the purpose of the tort system is to compen-
sate a party who has been injured by another, a worthy plaintiff in the
government contractor context should not go uncompensated. Accord-
ingly, if a plaintiff is precluded from recovering from both the govern-
ment and the military contractor, an alternate form of compensation
must be available to him.
When an injury is caused by a piece of military equipment, there are
three possible classes of plaintiffs: members of the military, civilian em-
ployees of the government, 286 and ordinary civilians. This section will
discuss the various compensation schemes available to each of these pro-
spective plaintiffs.
Presently, the government contractor defense applies almost exclu-
sively to actions brought by members of the military to recover for inju-
ries they sustain while in the line of duty. If the defense is successful, the
injured serviceman is prevented from recovering in tort against both the
United States and the military contractor who manufactured the equip-
ment. This does not mean, however, that injured servicemen will go un-
compensated.28 Rather, the injured serviceman is provided with a
statutory compensation system.2 8
Although members of the military cannot recover under the FTCA,
Congress has provided a "simple, certain, and uniform compensation for
injuries or death of those in [the] armed services. '2 89 The compensation
system the Supreme Court was referring to in Feres v. United States29
was the Veterans' Benefit Act.291 The VBA "establishes, as a substitute
for tort liability, a statutory 'no fault' compensation scheme which pro-
vides generous pensions to injured servicemen .... "I Recovery under
the VBA has been analogized to recovery under the workmens' compen-
286. This category of government employee would include the crew of the space shuttle.
287. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 452, 452 n.11 (9th Cir. 1983), cert
denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984) ("the serviceman or his family will not go uncompensated");
Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672 (1976) (servicemen "are assured
compensation regardless of fault under the Veterans' Benefits Act"); see Comment, supra note
6, at 294 ("injured military personnel are compensated by the provisions of the Veterans Bene-
fit Act").
288. The Veterans' Benefit Act ([BA), 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1983).
289. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950).
290. Id.
291. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1983); see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
292. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 671.
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sation statutes.293 Although the VBA does not compensate for loss of
companionship or services, the compensation under the VBA is not "re-
duced by the high transaction costs present in ordinary products liability
litigation." '294 Therefore, injured military personnel are provided with
just and adequate compensation.
If the plaintiff is a government employee who is not a member of the
military, a compensation scheme similar to the VBA is available. The
Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA)2 95 covers civilian em-
ployees of the government. 296  FECA contains an express exclusivity
clause which bars recovery under the FTCA.297 Thus, both civilian em-
ployees of the government and members of the military are restricted to
recovery under their respective uniform compensation systems.298
Finally, when an ordinary civilian is injured by a piece of military
equipment, the government contractor defense is inapplicable. Under
the first prong of the proposed test, the government must be immune
from liability under the Feres-Stencel doctrine.299 Because the doctrine
only applies to injuries arising out of military service, the doctrine would
not serve to bar actions brought by civilians.3"o As a result, the first
prong of the test would not be satisfied and the defense would fail.
An injured civilian plaintiff can also bring a tort action directly
against the United States under the FTCA.3 °1 Unlike military plaintiffs
who are barred from recovery by an exception to the FTCA, civilians are
specifically authorized under the FTCA to file tort actions against the
293. R. KiMBROUGH, supra note 48, § 21:64; Comment, The Government Contract Defense
in Strict Liability Suits for Defective Design, 48 U. CHi. L. Rlv. 1030, 1035 (1981). Under
workmen's compensation statutes, "the theory of negligence as the basis of liability is dis-
carded, the common-law defenses are eliminated, and a right to compensation is given for all
injuries incident to the employment, with some exceptions, the amount of which is limited and
determined in accordance with a definite schedule, in a summary and informal method of
procedure." R. KIMBROUGH, supra note 48, § 21:60.
294. McKay, 704 F.2d at 452 n. 11. Moreover, recovery under the VBA does not have the
associated long delays inherent in civil litigation. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673 (VBA "provides a
swift, efficient remedy for the injured serviceman").
295. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1982).
296. Comment, supra note 292, at 1035; R. KIMBROUGH, supra note 48, § 21:64.
297. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1982).
298. These compensation systems provide an "assured minimum level of compensation in
exchange for relief from the vagaries of litigation." Comment, supra note 292, at 1035.
299. Supra note 236 and accompanying text.
300. Pomerance, supra note 196, at 224 ("legal justification for the government contractor
defense is the government's immunity to suits by servicemen" (emphasis in original)); Craft,
supra note 239, at 45 ("[w]here a civilian brings a tort action, Feres-Stencel concern over mili-
tary discipline or veterans compensation would arguably not arise"); Ausness, supra note 55,
at 1017 ("Feres rule only applies to service-related injuries").
301. See supra note 61 and accompanying text for discussion of FrCA.
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government.30 2 Consequently, an injured civilian has two possible causes
of action. First, the Feres-Stencel doctrine does not prohibit an action
against the military contractor who was responsible for manufacturing
the equipment that caused the plaintiff's injury.30 3 Second, under the
FTCA an action can be filed directly against the United States.
Although the preceding discussion indicates that plaintiffs are not
completely without remedy, much remains to be accomplished to pro-
vide more complete compensation to plaintiffs who are injured by mili-
tary equipment. Initially, government agencies should be encouraged to
include voluntary indemnification clauses in their contracts.3 4 Another
possibility is the expanded use of cost-reimbursement contracts which
entitle a contractor to reimbursement for the reasonable costs of insur-
ance.3 5  Finally, legislation should be passed to provide reasonable in-
demnification for contractors. 0 6
VII. CONCLUSION
To date, six appellate circuits have accepted some form of the gov-
ernment contractor defense.30 7 The courts cite two main reasons why
the defense is necessary. First, the defense prevents unconstitutional ju-
dicial scrutiny of military judgment and interference with military disci-
pline.30 8 Second, the defense protects innocent government contractors
from unjust liability.
The present state of the defense is unacceptable. No uniform stan-
dard exists that contractors can use to predict the scope of liability to
302. 28 U.S.C. § 26800) (1983); see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
303. If the contractor is held liable, it is not barred from seeking indemnity from the gov-
ernment. "A contractor can pursue a claim for the Government's negligence under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act if the injured person is not a Government employee." Polinsky, Product
Liability and the United States Government Contractor, 14 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 312, 331 (1984).
304. Currently several federal regulations already specifically provide for the "indemnifica-
tion of contractors above the level of insurance without regard to any limitation of costs or
funds otherwise contained in the contract." Souk, Government Contracts and Tort Liability:
Time for Reform, 30 FED. B. NEWS & J. 70, 74 (1983).
305. Polinsky, supra note 302, at 327. Measures such as these "can be implemented quickly
and without high-level government involvement." Id
306. Souk, supra note 303, at 72; Polinsky, supra note 302, at 329. "Vital public policy
considerations-promotion of safe practices by the government and the desirability of fairness
and maximum industry participation in the procurement process-militate for legislative re-
form." Souk, supra note 303, at 75. Some indemnification statutes already exist. For exam-
ple, the military is authorized to indemnify contractors involved in the research and
development of certain "unusually hazardous" products. 10 U.S.C. § 2354 (1982). See also
Souk, supra note 303, at 73.
307. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text for appellate circuits adopting some
form of the government contractor defense.
308. See supra notes 59-92 and accompanying text.
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which they may be exposed. Some circuits, like the Fourth Circuit, con-
strue the defense very broadly and would allow its use in a large number
of circumstances. 319 Other circuits, like the Eleventh Circuit,3 1 define
the defense very narrowly and demand that contractors satisfy stringent
requirements before allowing the defense to be raised.3" As a result, a
contractor's liability could potentially vary greatly from circuit to circuit.
The formulation proposed in this Note strikes a balance between the
liberal and conservative constructions of the defense. Availability of the
defense is limited to only those cases where legitimate separation of pow-
ers concerns are present. Thus, the proposed defense protects innocent
contractors without spreading an unduly wide cloak of immunity. Fur-
ther, the plaintiff class is constrained to prevent the use of the defense in
actions brought by injured civilians. Finally, the proposed defense pro-
vides for the greatest possible disclosure of information to the
government.
In conclusion, the need for a government contractor defense is evi-
dent. The difficulty lies in specifying a standard. To this end, the pro-
posed government contractor defense is submitted. This formulation of
the defense prevents contractors who are responsible for design defects
from escaping liability while protecting innocent contractors. The pro-
posed formulation improves on recent constructions of the defense by
allowing the defense to be applied with a fine rather than broad brush.
Michael Overly*
Editor's note: After this Note was sent to the printer, the Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,
56 U.S.L.W. 4792 (1988). Relying on the discretionary function excep-
tion to the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Court essentially adopted the
Ninth Circuit's construction of the government contractor defense.
309. See supra notes 256-64 and accompanying text.
310. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985), petition for cert.
filed, 106 S. Ct. 2243 (1986).
311. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Shaw standard.
* This note is dedicated to my wife, Amy Field, and my parents, Robert and Phyllis
Overly, for their constant love and support.
